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Case Comment
Sailing the Uncharted Seas of Bad Faith:
Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v.
Sfandard Oil Co.
In 1971, Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc., sought to
lease a large space in a new marina planned by the city of Eu-
reka, California.' Since Seaman's intended to operate a marine
fuel distributorship, the city demanded written evidence of a
binding oil supply contract between Seaman's and an oil com-
pany before agreeing to the lease.2 Seaman's negotiated exten-
sively with Standard Oil Company of California to meet the
city's requirement,3 and Standard knew that Seaman's needed
the oil supply contract to obtain the lease.4 In 1972, after Sea-
man's and Standard agreed on all major points, Standard wrote
a letter to Seaman's describing the terms of the proposal.5 Sea-
1. Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752,
-' 686 P.2d 1158, 1160, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 356 (1984). Seaman's, a closely held
corporation with three shareholders, operated as a ship chandler, a dealer that
sells supplies and provides miscellaneous services to vessels. Its activities in-
cluded selling tax-free goods to vessels for offshore use and running a small
fueling station as the consignee of Mobil Oil Company. In the early 1970's, the
city of Eureka decided to redevelop the waterfront area where Seaman's was
located by building a modern marina with the assistance of the federal Eco-
nomic Development Administration (EDA). Seaman's entered into a lease
with the city for a small area in the new marina with the understanding that it
could renegotiate for the larger space it wanted in order to expand its opera-
tions and sublease the remaining area. Id.
2. Id,
3. Seaman's negotiated with several oil companies for a supply contract
but focused its efforts on Mobil and Standard. Id.
4. Standard acknowledged that its letter of October 11, 1972, was a re-
sponse to the city's pressure on Seaman's to produce "written documentation
of the deal it was negotiating with Standard which would provide tangible evi-
dence of Seaman's ability to pay rent on increased space in the project." Ap-
pellant's Opening Brief at 5, Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co.,
181 Cal. Rptr. 126 (Cal. Ct App. 1982), vacted, 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158,
206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984) (citations to trial record omitted). Although Standard
argued that the letter was intended merely to give Seaman's something to re-
assure the city that Standard was serious about carrying on the negotiations,
Seaman's maintained that the letter was a binding contract. Appellants Open-
ing Brief, supMa, at 7.
5. In the letter, dated October 11, 1972, Standard stated that Its purpose
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man's presented the letter to the city as evidence of an oil sup-
ply contract, and the city granted the lease.6
A year later, when the brunt of the Arab oil embargo hit
the United States, oil supplies tightened and prices rose.7 Stan-
dard notified Seaman's that, because of a federal fuel allocation
program, Standard could not supply Seaman's as described in
the 1972 letter.8 Undaunted, Seaman's instigated a series of re-
quests and appeals to the Federal Energy Office. 9 The agency
was "to confirm our various conversations regarding our mutual desires to es-
tablish Seaman's Direct Buying Service as a Chevron Marine Dealer, and to
ensure mutual understanding of the terms of our proposal." Appellant's
Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 6 (citation to trial record omitted). Standard
proposed the following terms: "(1) to sign a Chevron Marine Dealer agree-
ment with Seaman's for an initial term of 10 years; (2) to advance Seaman's
the cost of the new fueling facilities, or up to $75,000, which sum was to be
amortized over the life of the agreement at the rate of one cent per gallon of
oil; (3) to provide a 4.5 cent discount per gallon off the posted price of fuel; and
(4) to sign an agreement providing for Standard's right to cure in case of de-
fault by Seaman's." Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36
Cal. 3d 752, -, 686 P.2d 1158, 1160-61, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 356-57 (1984). Stan-
dard concluded that "this offer is subject to our mutual agreement on the spe-
cific wording of contracts to be drawn, endorsement and/or approval by
governmental offices involved, and continued approval of Seaman's credit sta-
tus at the time the agreements are to go into effect." Id at -, 686 P.2d at
1161, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 357 (footnote omitted). Agents of both Standard and
Seaman's signed the letter. Id
6. Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752,
__, 686 P.2d 1158, 1161, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 357 (1984).
7. Id See generally THE OIL CRISIS (R. Vernon ed.1976) (collection of ar-
ticles analyzing the significance of the 1973-1974 oil crisis); N. Y. Times, Jan.
15, 1973, at 1, col. 2 (surveying the nationwide impact of the fuel shortage).
8. Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752,
__ 686 P.2d 1158, 1161, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 357 (1984). Standard and Seaman's
also had signed a temporary marine dealership agreement in 1973 for fuel sup-
plies while the new marina was being built, but the final documents for the
ten-year contract discussed in the October 11, 1972, letter had never been
signed. Standard indicated, however, that it would be willing to go ahead with
the contract were it not for the federal fuel allocation program. One of Stan-
dard's agents even assisted Seaman's in obtaining and completing forms to re-
quest a fuel supply authorization from the Federal Energy Office (FEO). Id
9. I& at -, 686 P.2d at 1161-62, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 57-58. Seaman's initially
was successful in getting the FEO to issue a supply order, but Standard ap-
pealed the order, arguing that the FEO had erroneously designated Standard
as the base period supplier of Seaman's. Standard claimed that it had no bind-
ing contract with Seaman's and that Mobil was actually the Seaman's base pe-
riod supplier. Standard defended its decision to appeal the FEO order,
contending that it would set a bad precedent if Standard let the erroneous or-
der stand because the order would force Standard to share its limited oil sup-
ply with the base customer of another oil company, thus depleting the supply
for its own customers. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 10. Stan-
dard won its appeal; the FEO rescinded its order. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at -,
686 P.2d at 1162, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 358. Standard was jubilant at this result;
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told Seaman's that it would issue a supply order only if Sea-
man's could establish that it had a valid supply contract with
Standard.' ° Even though Seaman's told Standard that it could
not afford a trial to prove the existence of a contract, Standard
refused to stipulate that one existed; Standards representative
laughed and told Seaman's, "See you in court."" Without a
supply contract, Seaman's could not meet its obligation to the
city and soon went out of business.'2
Shortly thereafter, Seaman's sued Standard for breach of
contract and tortious breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.13 At trial the jury found for Seaman's on
both counts and awarded punitive damages on the tort claim
amounting to roughly twenty-eight times the compensatory
damages for Standard's breach of contract.14 The California
Court of Appeal agreed that Standard's 1972 letter created an
enforceable contract but held that no tort cause of action ex-
isted for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in a commercial contract.'5 On appeal, in Seaman's Di-
internal memoranda noted: "'[g]reat!!' 'We are recommending to other
div[isions] that they follow your example.'" Id. Seaman's appealed and the
decision was reversed again. The new decision provided that a supply order
would be issued upon the filing of a court decree that a valid contract existed
between Seaman's and Standard. 1d
10. Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752,
-, 686 P.2d 1158, 1162, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 358 (1984).
11. Id.
12. See id. Seaman's went out of business instead of seeking a declaratory
judgment that a contract existed. As a result, Seaman's eventually defaulted
on its rent prepayment and lost its lease with the city of Eureka. Appellant's
Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 1.
13. Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752,
-, 686 P.2d 1158, 1162, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 358 (1984). Seaman's also accused
Standard of tortious interference with its contractual relationship with the city
of Eureka and of fraud. At trial, Seaman's won on all but the fraud count. Id
14. The jury awarded compensatory damages of $397,050 for breach of
contract, $397,050 in compensatory and $11,058,810 in punitive damages for tor-
tious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and
$1,588,200 in compensatory and $11,058,810 in punitive damages for intentional
interference with an advantageous business relationship. Seaman's Direct
Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, -, 686 P.2d 1158, 1162,
206 Cal. Rptr. 354,358. The trial court reduced the punitive damages to $1 mil-
lion on the bad faith claim and to $6 million on the intentional interference
claim. 1d
15. Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 181 Cal. Rptr.
126, 136 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982), vacated, 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal.
Rptr. 354 (1984). The court also reversed the jury's verdict on the intentional
interference claim, finding that the trial court's instructions were erroneous.
See id. at 131-32.
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rect Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co.,16 the California
Supreme Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the
facts justified extending tort liability for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith to a commercial contract.17 Instead, the
court created a new tort, holding that a party that breaches a
contract and then denies the contract's existence "in bad faith
and without probable cause" is liable in tort.'8 The court rea-
soned that denying the existence of a contract in bad faith is
more culpable conduct than merely breaching a contract be-
cause "[it offends accepted notions of business ethics."' 9 The
court then added, without explanation, that the creation of a
tort for bad faith denial of contract would not disrupt bargain-
ing in commercial transactions.20
This Comment argues that bad faith denial of the existence
of a contract is a variation of the tortious breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, not a separate tort.
Moreover, as Seaman's illustrates, the policy reasons for impos-
ing tort liability for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith do not apply to commercial contracts. Consequently, this
Comment concludes that courts should not award tort damages
for bad faith breaches of commercial contracts. Instead, courts
should take a functional approach in fashioning remedies for
bad faith breaches, first focusing on the plaintiff's expectations
under the contract and then modifying the rules that govern
traditional contract remedies to reflect those expectations.
16. 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
17. See id at -, 686 P.2d at 1160, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 356. The court ac-
knowledged that the implied covenant of good faith exists in all contracts but
noted that a breach of the covenant giving rise to tort remedies is marked by a
"special relationship" between the parties, "characterized by elements of pub-
lic interest, adhesion, and fiduciary responsibility." Id at -, 686 P.2d at 1166,
206 Cal. Rptr. at 362. The court cited the insurance and employment contexts
as examples of such special relationships. See id at -, 686 P.2d at 1166 & n.6,
206 Cal. Rptr. at 362 & n.6. Although it expressed some reservations, the court
intimated that an extension of the tort to the commercial context might be ap-
propriate under the right circumstances. See i&i at -, 686 P.2d at 1166-67, 206
Cal. Rptr. at 362-63.
18. See id. at -, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363. The court re-
manded the case for a new trial, however, since the jury was not instructed
that in order to impose tort liability it had to find that Standard denied the
existence of the contract in bad faith. See id at -, 686 P.2d at 1170, 206 Cal.
Rptr. at 366.
19. Id at -, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
20. See id.
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I. BAD FAITH DENIAL OF CONTRACT AND TORTIOUS
BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF
GOOD FAITH: ALL IN THE FAMILY
The obligation to perform in good faith is inherent in every
contract.2 ' Traditionally, breach of this implied covenant of
21. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205
(1981). Attempts to define "good faith" under both the Uniform Commercial
Code and the common law have generally resulted in vague statements.
The Uniform Commercial Code defines good faith as "honesty in fact in
the conduct or transaction concerned." U.C.C. § 1-201(19). This language sug-
gests a subjective standard of good faith, one that focuses on the actor's actual
state of mind. Yet commentators argue that although the subjective standard
may be appropriate for the Code provisions concerning good faith purchase,
e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-403(1), 3-302(1)(b), the purpose of which is to facilitate the
transfer of goods and commercial paper, an objective standard, focusing on
fairness or reasonableness, is the proper measure of the obligation of good
faith performance. See Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial
Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. ClI. L. REV. 666,
668-72 (1963); Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 207-15 (1968).
The special provision for merchants in article 2 incorporates an objective stan-
dard, stating that for a merchant good faith "means honesty in fact and the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade."
U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b). Some courts have applied an objective standard of good
faith even to nonmerchants by reading § 1-203 together with § 1-103, which in-
corporates general contract principles to the extent that they are not inconsis-
tent with the Code. See Preston v. United States, 696 F.2d 528, 538-39 (7th Cir.
1982) (applying Wisconsin law); Skeels v. Universal C.LT. Credit Corp., 335
F.2d 846, 851 (3d Cir. 1964) (applying Pennsylvania law). But see Steinmetz v.
Bradbury Co., 618 F.2d 21, 25 (8th Cir. 1980) (applying Iowa law in stating that
"good faith means no more than honesty in fact in the transaction" but noting
that a higher standard exists for merchants).
In non-UCC cases, courts have phrased the good faith obligation in various
ways. See e g., Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 2d 559, 564, 212 P.2d 878, 881
(1949) ("In every contract there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing that neither party will do anything which injures the right of the other
to receive the benefits of the agreement."); Colwell Co. v. Hubert, 248 Cal.
App. 2d 567, 575, 56 Cal. Rptr. 753, 759 (1967) (" This covenant not only im-
poses upon each contracting party the duty to refrain from doing anything
which would render performance of the contract impossible by any act of his
own, but also the duty to do everything that the contract presupposes that he
will do to accomplish its purpose.' ") (quoting Harm v. Frasher, 181 Cal. App.
2d 405, 417, 5 Cal. Rptr. 367, 374 (1960)); Warnock v. Bonneville Gen. Agency,
Inc., 271 Or. 634, 638, 533 P.2d 333, 335 (1975) (noting that "it is an implied pro-
vision in every contract that neither party will engage in any act that will
'have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive
the fruits of the contract.' ") (quoting Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 235 Or. 7,
16, 383 P.2d 107,112 (1963) (quoting 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 561,
at 278 (1960))); Gregerson v. Jensen, 617 P.2d 369, 373 n.9 (Utah 1980) (stating
that "parties are obliged to cooperate with each other in good faith in the per-
formance of a contract").
The most accurate description of the phrase "good faith" is that it has no
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good faith has given rise to ordinary contract damages. 22 In a
contract action, consequential damages for breach of the im-
plied covenant of good faith are available only to the extent
that they reasonably could have been foreseen by the parties at
the time of contracting.23 A plaintiff also must prove its con-
tract damages with reasonable certainty, which often is a diffi-
cult task when the damages consist mostly of lost profits.24
Moreover, punitive damages generally are not available in a
contract action.2
In two landmark cases, however, the California Supreme
Court departed from these traditional limitations by holding
that a breach of the implied covenant of good faith in the insur-
ance context may give rise to tort liability.2 6 Damages for tor-
tious breach of the implied covenant are not limited by the
definite meaning of its own: "In a particular context, the phrase takes on spe-
cific meaning, but usually this is only by way of contrast with the specific form
of bad faith . . . ruled out." Summers, supra, at 201; see also id. at 203 (con.
trasting specific examples of bad faith and good faith). Thus, courts generally
define good faith by explaining what it is not. See generally 3 A. CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 541, at 97 (1960) (discussing the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing); 5 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CON.
TRACTS § 670, at 159 (W. Jaeger 3rd ed. 1961) (same).
22. See, e.g., Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 101, 364
N.E.2d 1251, 1257 (1977).
23. This is the famous foreseeability rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch.
341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 14-5, at 524 (1977). There actually are two rules of damages in
Hadley. The first rule permits recovery of general damages, those arising nat-
urally from the breach itself. An example of general contract damages is the
difference between the contract price and the fair market value of perform-
ance at the time of breach. The second rule, the foreseeability rule, prohibits
recovery of damages arising as a consequence of the breach unless they were
reasonably foreseeable by the parties at the time of contracting. Id. at 525.
Lost profits during a factory shutdown caused by the breach of contract is an
example of such consequential damages.
24. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 23, § 14-8, at 528; see Aldon In-
dus., Inc. v. Don Myers & Assocs., Inc., 517 F.2d 188, 191 (5th Cir. 1975); Note,
Lost Profits and Hadley v. Baxendale, 19 WASHBURN L.J. 488, 506-17 (1980).
25. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 23, § 14-3, at 520. This gener-
ally has been true no matter how malicious the breach. Id For an excellent
discussion of this rule and its exceptions, see Sullivan, Punitive Damages in
the Law of Contract. The Reality and the Illusion of Legal Change, 61 MINN.
L. REv. 207 (1977).
26. See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 430-31, 426 P.2d 173, 176-
77, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16-17 (1967) (holding that an insurer's unreasonable re-
fusal to settle with a third party within the insured's policy limits violated the
implied covenant of good faith, giving rise to tort liability); Comunale v. Trad-
ers & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 660-61, 328 P.2d 198, 202 (1958) (same). The
California Supreme Court later held that an insurer may commit a tortious
breach of the implied covenant of good faith by unreasonably refusing to pay
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traditional contract law rules of foreseeability and certainty.2
In addition, punitive damages are available for tortious breach
of the implied covenant if the insurer's behavior amounts to
malice, fraud, or oppression; bad faith alone is insufficient.2
Although many jurisdictions now recognize a cause of action
for tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith in the
insurance context,2 most courts confronting the issue have re-
fused to extend to the commercial context tort liability for
breach of the implied covenant.30
policy benefits owed to the insured. See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d
566, 575, 510 P.2d 1032, 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 485 (1973).
27. See e.g., Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 31 Cal. 3d 452, 460-62, 521
P.2d 1103, 1108-10, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711, 716-18 (1974); United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co. v. Peterson, 91 Nev. 617, 619-20, 540 P.2d 1070, 1071 (1975); Corwin
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 279 N.W.2d 638, 643
(N.D. 1979); Christian v. American Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899, 904
(Okla. 1978).
28. See e-g., Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910, 922-23, 582 P.2d
980, 986-87, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389, 395-96 (1978); Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co.,
11 Cal. 3d 452, 462-63, 521 P.2d 1103, 1110, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711, 718 (1974).
29. See Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 635 S.W.2d 596, 601 n.2 (Tex. Ct. App.
1982) (James, J., dissenting) (collecting cases imposing a duty of good faith and
fair dealing on an insurer in settlement negotiations), rev'd, 652 S.W.2d 932
(Tex. 1983); Kornblum, Recent Cases Interpreting the Implied Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 30 Def. L.J. 411, 431 n.50 (1981) (collecting cases
recognizing a tort cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith in insurance contracts); Louderback & Jurika, Standards for Limiting
the Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contrac4 16 U.S.FJ. REV. 187, 199 (1982) (giv-
ing examples of unreasonable behavior by an insurer toward its insured); see
also Savio v. Travelers Ins. Co., 678 P.2d 549, 552 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983) (ex-
tending this bad faith theory to recognize an employee's cause of action against
a workers' compensation insurer for tortious breach of the implied covenant of
good faith during the processing and settlement of a claim); Birkenbuel v.
Montana State Compensation Ins. Fund, - Mont. - -, 687 P.2d 700, 702-03
(1984) (permitting tort action against State Compensation Insurance Fund but
holding that punitive damages are not recoverable from this state agency).
Other courts have refused to recognize tort liability for an insurer's breach of
the implied covenant of good faith. See Kerwin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 409 Mich. 401, 423, 295 N.W.2d 50, 56 (1980); .A.A. Pool Serv. & Sup-
ply, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 121 RI. 96, 98, 395 A.2d 724, 726 (1978).
30. Two California appellate courts had already rejected claims of tortious
breach of the implied covenant of good faith in commercial contracts by the
time Seaman's reached the California Supreme Court. See Wagner v. Benson,
101 Cal. App. 3d 27, 33, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516, 520 (1980) (bank that lent money to
investor did not commit a tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith
by failing to provide investor with managment information on the investor's
high-risk investment); Sawyer v. Bank of Am., 83 Cal. App. 3d 135, 139, 145
Cal. Rptr. 623, 625-26 (1978) (bank did not commit a tortious breach of the im-
plied covenant of good faith in its refusal to admit liability for breaching a con-
tract by failing to obtain insurance on borrower's truck).
Several other jurisdictions have rejected tort claims for breaches of the
implied covenant of good faith in commercial contracts. See, eg., Kennedy
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The majority in Seaman's created the new tort of bad faith
denial of the existence of a contract in order to avoid deciding
whether to extend tort liability for breach of the implied cove-
nant of good faith to the commercial context. There is, how-
ever, no basis for an independent tort of bad faith denial of
Elec. Co., Inc. v. Moore-Handley, Inc., 437 So. 2d 76, 81 (Ala. 1983) (refusing to
extend the tort cause of action used in insurance cases to a commercial sales
contract); Pure Oil Co. v. C.L. Dukes, 101 Ga. App. 786, 787, 115 S.E.2d 449, 450
(1960) (alleged violations of plaintiff's contractual rights to occupy leased
premises and to purchase petroleum products from defendant did not give
plaintiff a right of action in tort, despite allegations of defendant's "willful,"
"malicious," and "arbitrary" breach, in the absence of any allegations of facts
disclosing a violation of a public duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff);
Wild v. Rarig, 302 Minn. 419, 442, 234 N.W.2d 775, 790 (1975) (scientist alleging
breach of a contract to sponsor a research project was not entitled to recover
tort damages for the malicious breach of an implied covenant of good faith),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 902 (1976); Aluevich v. Harrah's, 99 Nev. 215, 217, 660
P.2d 986, 987 (1983) (refusing to extend a tort cause of action for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith to a commercial lease because the contract did
not involve "a special element of reliance such as that found in partnership,
insurance, and franchise agreements"), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 998 (1984).
For federal cases rejecting the theory of tortious breach of the implied
covenant of good faith in the commercial context under applicable state law,
see Battista v. Lebanon Trotting Ass'n, 538 F.2d 111, 118 (6th Cir. 1976) (under
Ohio law an insurer may be subject to tort liability for breach of its implied
duty of good faith and fair dealing with respect to its insured, but tort liability
does not extend to ordinary contracts between businesspersons because the
special considerations present in a consumer-held insurance contract do not
apply); California Wholesale Elec. Co. v. Micro Switch, 1983-1 TRADE CASES
(CCH) 1 65,253, at 69,503 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (plaintiff not entitled to tort relief
for breach of the covenant of good faith since tort remedies for alleged con-
tractual breaches do not extend to commercial relationships); Brown-Marx As-
socs., Ltd. v. Emigrant Say. Bank, 527 F. Supp. 277, 283 (N.D. Ala. 1981) (under
Alabama law plaintiff could not recover from bank under tort theory of bad
faith for bank's alleged intentional and malicious refusal to close on a loan
commitment since the tort of bad faith was limited to the insurance context),
affd, 703 F.2d 1361 (11th Cir. 1983); Iron Mountain Sec. Storage v. American
Specialty Foods, 457 F. Supp. 1158, 1169 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (Pennsylvannia law
does not allow tort recovery for breach of implied contractual duty of good
faith when breach occurred in ordinary commercial contract for repurchase of
promissory note).
This refusal to extend the availability of tort remedies beyond the insur-
ance context is not unanimous, however. See Forty Exchange Co. v. Cohen,
125 Misc. 2d 475, 491-93, 479 N.Y.S.2d 628, 638-40 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1984) (recogniz-
ing the existence of a tort for bad faith breach of a commercial lease but find-
ing the breach in this case privileged); cases cited infra notes 83-84 (tort
liability for bad faith breaches in the banking and franchise contexts). For two
excellent discussions of the growth of the tortious breach of the implied cove-
nant of good faith in noninsurance contracts, see Diamond, The Tort of Bad
Faith Breach of Contract" When, If At All, Should It Be Extended Beyond In.
surance Transactions, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 425 (1981); Louderback & Jurika,
supra note 29.
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contract. Bad faith denial of contract may seem similar on a su-
perficial level to the torts of abuse of legal process and wrong-
ful civil proceedings in that all three are intended to protect
persons from unwarranted litigation.3 ' These other two torts
are different from the one invented in Seaman's, however, be-
cause they are designed to deter the frivolous initiation of a
legal process or proceeding, not the defense of a suit brought by
another party.3 Allowing a tort cause of action for the mali-
cious assertion of a defense could lead to endless lawsuits over
the parties' behavior during litigation.3 In addition, the need
to create a tort to deter the imposition of a defense in bad faith
is limited since a motion for summary judgment provides an ef-
ficient way of disposing of a truly baseless defense.34 Finally,
there is a countervailing principle in the adversary system of
encouraging a defendant to raise any defense it wishes.as The
Seventh Circuit has used this last rationale to reject the theory
that a defendant commits a tort by denying liability for breach
31. See W. KEETON, PRossER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 119, at
870 (5th ed. 1984).
32. The tort of abuse of legal process occurs when a party willfully uses a
legal process, such as attachment, garnishment, or arrest, to accomplish a pur-
pose for which it was not intended. Id. § 120, at 898-99. The tort of wrongful
civil proceedings occurs when an unsuccessful plaintiff has initiated its action
without probable cause and for a purpose other than securing the proper adju-
dication of the claim. RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674 (1977). Since
the act of raising a defense is an authorized response to a claim, the plaintiff
cannot argue that it is an abuse of legal process, even if the defendant's mo-
tives are unethical. See W. KEETON, supra note 31, § 119, at 898. Similarly, a
defendant who merely interposes a defense is not subject to an action for
wrongful civil proceedings. See i& § 120, at 893; Annot. 65 AJLR.3d 901, 911-14
(1975).
33. See Wolf v. Wolf, 26 A.D.2d 529, 530, 271 N.Y.S.2d 155, 157 (1966); Rap-
paport v. Rappaport, 44 Misc. 2d 523, 525, 254 N.Y.S.2d 174, 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1964), affd, 24 AD.2d 844, 263 N.Y.S.2d 442 (1965), appeal denied, 16 N.Y.2d
487, 266 N.Y.S.2d 1025, 213 N.E.2d 697 (1965).
34. See Annot, supra note 32, at 909-10. The motion to strike a pleading,
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(f), CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 436 (West Supp. 1983-1984), is
not as useful as is a motion for summary judgment since many courts will not
examine the good faith of the defendant on a motion to strike. See Annot.,
supra note 32, at 909. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for a sanc-
tion of expenses, including attorney's fees, and possibly even contempt of court
if it appears to the judge at any time that affidavits presented for, or in opposi-
tion to, a motion for summary judgment were made "in bad faith or solely for
the purpose of delay." FED. . Civ. P. 56(g); cf CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(i)
(West Supp. 1983-1984) (if a court determines that an affidavit submitted in
connection with a motion for summary judgment is offered in bad faith, it may
award the other party reasonable expenses incurred as a result of the filing of
the affidavit).
35. See Ritter v. Ritter, 381 l. 549, 555, 46 N.E.2d 41, 44 (1943).
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of contract in bad faith.36
Furthermore, the primary authority the court in Seaman's
used to support its creation of a new tort, Adams v. Crater Well
Drilling,37 is factually and theoretically distinguishable from
Seaman's. Adams was an action for restitution in a situation
bordering on extortion. 38 Even if Standard had no basis for de-
nying the existence of the contract, its behavior did not ap-
proach the level of coercion found in Adams.39 Also, in Adams
the theoretical basis for restitution and punitive damages was
the deterrence of unjust enrichment in the absence of a con-
tract.40 This theory is inapplicable in Seaman's since even if
36. See Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 729 (7th Cir. 1979),
cert denied 445 U.S. 917 (1980). The court reasoned that imposing punitive
damages on a party for asserting defenses that it felt were appropriate, even if
they turned out to be without merit, would violate the public policy favoring
unfettered access to the courts:
Nothing in the case law suggests that [tort] liability may stem from
the defense of a lawsuit or from the decision to defend rather than
settle. Such a rule would infringe basic rights in our system of juris-
prudence. Under our jurisprudence the defendant may present any
defense to such an action that he may have or that he may deem expe-
dient, and so doing he will not be subjecting himself to a second suit
by the plaintiff based on the wrongful conduct of the defendant in
causing the plaintiff to sue him or in defending the action. The rule is
the same even though the wrongful conduct of the defendant is will-
ful, intentional, malicious or fraudulent.
Id. at 729 (quoting Ritter v. Ritter, 381 Ill. 549, 555, 46 N.E.2d 41, 44 (1943))
(first emphasis in original, second one added).
37. 276 Or. 789, 556 P.2d 679 (1976), cited in Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at-, 686
P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
38. See Adams, 276 Or. at 793-95, 556 P.2d at 680. The plaintiff argued
that the defendant had overcharged him for drilling a well. The defendant,
knowing that its claim was baseless, threatened to begin legal proceedings if
the plaintiff did not pay his account immediately. The plaintiff, fearing that a
lawsuit would aggravate the condition of his critically ill wife, paid the over-
charge. The trial judge decided that the plaintiff had failed to state a cause of
action for fraud, but the Arizona Supreme Court shaped his complaint to state
a cause of action for money had and received. See id. at 791-93, 556 P.2d at 680-
81.
39. See supra note 38. Note that in Adams, the defendant originally had
threatened a baseless proceeding against the plaintiff. Standard, in contrast,
merely raised a defense to the assertion of Seaman's that it had a contract
with Standard. Although in Adams the defendant's behavior in threatening a
lawsuit did not constitute wrongful civil proceedings or abuse of legal process,
see supra note 32, it came close to doing so. The award of punitive damages
against the Adams defendant may be consistent with the policy of protecting
persons against baseless lawsuits, but that policy does not apply to a defendant
such as Standard that initiates no proceedings and merely defends itself.
40. The Adams court relied on a California Supreme Court case, Ward v.
Taggart, 51 Cal. 2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 (1959), cited in Adams, 276 Or. at 794, 556
P.2d at 682, to support its award of restitution and punitive damages. In Ward,
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there was technically no binding agreement, Seaman's had not
begun to perform at the time that Standard denied the con-
tract's existence' and, therefore, Seaman's had bestowed no
benefit on Standard that could result in unjust enrichment.
Moreover, Standard's anticipatory repudiation of what the
court found to be an enforceable contract meant that Seaman's
had a right to damages for breach of contract, which would en-
compass its restitutionary interest as well as the potential gains
prevented by the breach.4 Consequently, the authority cited
by the Seaman's court does not support its creation of a new
tort of bad faith denial of contract.43
Chief Justice Bird argued in her separate opinion" that,
the court upheld an award of $72,049.20 in compensatory damages and $36,000
in punitive damages against a real estate broker who made a secret profit at
the plaintiffs' expense by overstating a seller's asking price, buying the prop-
erty himself, and then selling the property to the plaintiffs at the overstated
price. See Ward, 51 Cal. 2d at 739-40, 336 P.2d at 535-36. The court reasoned
that punitive damages were necessary in this situation since restitution alone
would have no real deterrent effect. See id. at 743,a336 P.2d at 538; see also
Davis v. Tyee Indus., Inc., 58 Or. App. 292, 294, 296-98, 648 P.2d 388, 389, 391-92
(1982) (upholding an award of $6,195.81 in compensatory damages and $90,000
in punitive damages against an employer that wrongfully witheld an em-
ployee's commissions by crediting the sales to the company itself), affd, 295
Or. 467, 668 P.2d 1186 (1983). Adams, Ward, and Davis were all actions for
restitution, based on the principle that if the defendant commits a tort such as
fraud, misrepresentation, or conversion resulting in its unjust enrichment at
the plaintiff's expense, the plaintiff may "'waive' the tort action and sue in-
stead on a theoretical and fictious contract of restitution of the benefits which
the defendant has so received." W. KEErON, supra note 31, § 94, at 672-73; see
Dawson, Duress Through Civil Litigation, 45 MICH. L. REv. 571, 577-78 (1947)
(noting that the threat of litigation can result in unjust enrichment by forcing
an unfair settlement and thus can give rise to an action in restitution).
Adams, Davis, and Ward, however, were not ordinary restitution cases, in
which it merely would be unjust to let the defendant keep the plaintiff's
money. For instance, the court in Davis stated that the Adams defendant's be-
havior amounted to the tort of coercion. See Davis, 58 Or. App. at 298, 648
P.2d at 692. In both Davis and Ward the defendants' conduct constituted the
tort of conversion; the defendants intentionally witheld the plaintiffs' profits,
knowing that they had no right to retain them. See ui Such obvious tortious
conduct by the defendants in these cases may account for the courts' awards of
punitive damages.
41. See Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at -, 686 P.2d at 1161-62, 206 Cal. Rptr. at
357-58.
42. See U.C.C. § 2-610(b); J. CALAmAP & J. PERUL, supra note 23, § 14-
5, at 579.
43. The court also cited Jones v. Abriani, 169 Ind. App. 556, 350 NE.2d 635
(1976). Jones is inapposite, however, since it involved blatant overreaching by
a seller of a defective mobile home against a young married couple that had
spent their entire savings on the new home. See ic. at 560-63, 350 N.E.2d at
639-40.
44. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at -, 686 P.2d at 1170-77, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 366-73
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despite the majority's attempt to disguise what it was doing, the
new tort was really a form of tortious breach of the implied
covenant of good faith.45 Using insurance cases as a guide,40 she
noted that an insurer commits a tortious breach of the implied
covenant of good faith when it acts unreasonably in light of the
justifiable expectations of the insured.47 She maintained that
although the nature and extent of the duty imposed by the im-
plied covenant of good faith vary from one contract to another
depending on the expectations of the parties involved, 48 parties
in most commercial contracts have a fundamental expectation
of compensation in case of breach, an expectation that makes
the possibility of breach acceptable. 49 Thus, she argued, "When
the breaching party acts in bad faith to shield itself entirely
from liability for contract damages, . . . the duty of good faith
and fair dealing is violated."5 0 In applying this approach to the
agreement Seaman's had with Standard, however, Chief Justice
Bird argued that because Seaman's needed the supply contract
with Standard to obtain a lease in the new marina, the expecta-
tions of Seaman's did not include the possibility of a breach. 51
Seaman's therefore could recover in tort, she concluded, if it
(Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting). Chief Justice Bird dissented only on
the issue of breach of the implied covenant of good faith. See id. at -, 686
P.2d at 1170-71, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 366-67.
45. See id at -, 686 P.2d at 1171, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 367. Chief Justice Bird
would have had the court hold that, under certain circumstances, a breach of
contract can form the basis of a tort action for breach of the implied covenant
of good faith. See id.
46. See id. at -, 686 P.2d at 1171, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 367 (citing Neal v.
Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910, 582 P.2d 980, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1978);
Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470
(1975)).
47. See Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at -, 686 P.2d at 1171-72, 206 Cal. Rptr. at
367-68. For example, since one of the reasons an insured takes out liability in-
surance is to avoid litigation, the insured develops a reasonable expectation
that the insurer will not refuse a settlement offer without cause. The insurer
therefore breaches the implied covenant of good faith by unreasonably refus-
ing a settlement offer. Id. at -, 686 P.2d at 1172, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 368 (citing
Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 430, 426 P.2d 173, 176-77, 58 Cal. Rptr.
13, 16-17 (1967)).
48. See Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at -, 686 P.2d'at 1172, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
49. See id at -, 686 P.2d at 1173, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 369. Chief Justice Bird
noted that in many instances, breaching a contract results in the most econom-
ically efficient allocation of resources. See id. (citing R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 55 (1972)).
50. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at -, 686 P.2d at 1173, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
51. See id at _, 686 P.2d at 1175, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 371. She stressed that
Standard knew that Seaman's needed a binding contract with an oil supplier.
See id.
1172 [Vol. 69:1161
BAD FAITH BREACH
could demonstrate that Standard repudiated the contract in bad
faith.52
Chief Justice Bird's reasoning, premised on the assumption
that the possibility of breach was not within the parties' justi-
fied expectations, is flawed because a party to a commercial
contract should recognize that a breach by the other party is al-
ways a possibility.a3 Nevertheless, Chief Justice Bird was cor-
rect in recognizing that Standard breached the implied
covenant of good faith if it denied the existence of the contract
in bad faith. Although Seaman's could not reasonably have as-
sumed Standard would never breach, it did have a justifiable
expectation of being able to recover contract damages if Stan-
dard did breach. The implied covenant, which requires that
"neither party do anything which will deprive the other of the
benefits of the agreement,"' 4 protects this expectation of rea-
sonable compensation as one of the benefits inherent in enter-
ing a contract. Even though the parties had not worked out the
specifics of all the contract terms,- Standard apparently had
made a binding agreement to supply Seaman's.s When Stan-
dard could not meet its obligation to Seaman's, however, Stan-
dard tried to avoid all liability by arguing that the letter was
too indefinite to constitute a contract.5 If there was no legiti-
mate basis for denying the existence of the contract, Standard
52. See id. Even though Chief Justice Bird found that Standards denial
had to be made in bad faith to support tort liability, she thought there was suf-
ficient evidence of bad faith in the record to avoid remanding. See id. at
686 P.2d at 1177, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
Chief Justice Bird also suggested a different rule for unexpected breaches
generally. -"Where the possibility of breach was not reasonably expected at the
inception of the contract, the voluntary breach of an acknowledged contract is
in itself a violation of the duty to deal fairly and in good faith." Id. Since
Standard did not acknowledge the existence of the contract, this rule was in-
applicable. It therefore was necessary for Seaman's to prove that Standard de-
nied the existence of the contract in bad faith. Id.
53. See Farnsworth, Legal Remedies For Breach of Contrac 70 COLUML L.
REV. 1145, 1147 (1970) ("Our system ... is not directed at compulsion of
promisors to prevent breach; rather, it is aimed at relief to promisees to re-
dress breach.") (emphasis in original). Chief Justice Bird's analysis seems
more relevant to whether the losses incurred by Seaman's were sufficiently
foreseeable to qualify as consequential damages. See supra note 23 and accom-
panying text.
54. Seamanls, 36 Cal. 3d at -, 686 P.2d at 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362 (cita-
tion omitted).
55. See supra note 5 (setting forth the terms of the agreement).
56. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at -, 686 P.2d at 1162, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
57. Id. at _,686 P.2d at 1162-63, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 358-59. The court re-
sponded to Standard's argument in no uncertain terms: '"ut simply, this con-
tention is not well taken." Id. at -, 686 P.2d at 1162, 206 CaL Rptr. at 358.
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acted in bad faith by attempting to deprive Seaman's of a bene-
fit it reasonably could have expected by entering a contract-
adequate compensation in case of Standard's breach.58 Thus,
although the Seaman's majority felt compelled to create a new
tort to handle fact situations like that in Seaman's, Standard's
behavior actually amounted to a breach of the implied covenant
of good faith.5 9
58. On remand, the jury ultimately must determine whether Standard de-
nied the existence of the contract in bad faith, but it is difficult to imagine a
reasonable basis for Standard's disputing the contract's existence. The Sea-
man's court held that a denial must be made in bad faith and without prob-
able cause to constitute a tort. See id. at -, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at
363. The court did not explain what it meant by "probable cause," but presum-
ably it would be determined under the objective "reasonable person" standard
used in actions for wrongful civil proceedings. See Note, Groundless Litigation
and the Malicious Prosecution Debate: A Historical Analysis, 88 YALE L.J.
1218, 1234 n.113 (1979).
59. A comparison of Seaman's with Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins.
Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970), illustrates the lack of any
meaningful distinction between the new tort created in Seaman's and the tor-
tious breach of the implied covenant of good faith. In Fletcher, the plaintiff
hurt his back and began collecting disability benefits under his policy with the
defendant insurance company. The insurance company first attempted to
limit its liability by manufacturing a meritless dispute over the policy lan-
guage, then denied liability altogether, and ultimately demanded reimburse-
ment for the earlier payments, alleging that the plaintiff had misrepresented
his physical condition when applying for the policy. Id. at 388-90, 89 Cal. Rptr.
at 84-85. When the plaintiff objected, the company offered to drop Its claim for
reimbursement if the plaintiff would allow it to cancel his policy and release it
from further litigation, threatening to sue if the plaintiff refused. Id. at 390-91,
89 Cal. Rptr. at 86. The court held that this behavior constituted a tortious
breach of the implied covenant of good faith, stating that "the implied-in-law
duty of good faith and fair dealing imposes upon a disability insurer a duty not
to threaten to withhold or actually withhold payments, maliciously and with-
out probable cause, for the purpose of injuring its insured by depriving him of
the benefits of the policy." 1d. at 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
Like the insurance company in Fletcher, Standard attempted to use the
threat of prolonged and expensive litigation to deprive an innocent party of its
justifiable expectations. Compare Note, The Expanding Availability of Puni-
tive Damages in Contract Actions, 8 IND. L. REv. 668, 679 (1975) ("By the as-
sertion of pure economic power, with no reasonable color of legal right,
Western National attempted to compel Fletcher to give up a valid legal claim
against them.") with Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at -, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr.
at 363 (criticizing a party that, without any legitmate defense, seeks to avoid
liability on a meritorious contract claim by adopting a "see you in court" posi-
tion).
Some courts restate the insurer's obligation of good faith as the duty of
the insurer to give as much consideration to the insured's interests as It gives
to its own. See, e.g., Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 460, 521
P.2d 1103, 1109, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711, 717 (1974). Application of this standard to
Fletcher indicates that the insurer breached the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing by failing to give as much consideration to the interests of the
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Even if Standard breached the implied covenant of good
faith by denying the existence of the contract, its conduct
should not necessarily be considered tortious, as it would be in
the insurance context.60 Although the majority expressed a re-
luctance to extend tort remedies for breach of the implied cove-
nant of good faith to the commercial setting, it did not rule out
that possibility,6 and its failure to distinguish its new tort from
a breach of the implied covenant of good faith only exacerbated
the confusion.62 Instead of dodging the issue, the court should
insured in receiving his disability payments as it gave to its own interests in
limiting its liability. The Seaman's majority imposed the same duty to respect
the rights of the other contracting party on Standard by declaring that a bad
faith refusal to acknowledge the existence of the contract was a tort. Under
the majority's analysis, if a clear contract right existed, Standard was obliged
to give the potential losses Seaman's faced from Standard's denial of the exist-
ence of the contract as much consideration as it did Standard's potential gain.
The court stated that the act of denying the existence of a contract in bad faith
"goes beyond the mere breach of contract. It offends accepted notions of busi-
ness ethics." Seamans, 36 Cal. 3d at -, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
Thus, Standard's alleged tortious behavior in denying the existence of a con-
tract without cause is indistinguishable from what the California courts have
in the past called a tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith.
60. See supra notes 28-29, 46 & 59 and accompanying text.
61. The Seaman's court stated:
When we move from such special relationships [as that between in-
surer and insured] to consideration of the tort remedy in the context
of the ordinary commercial contract, we move into largely uncharted
and potentially dangerous waters. Here, parties of roughly equal bar-
gaining power are free to shape the contours of their agreement and
to include provisions for attorney fees and liquidated damages in the
event of breach. They may not be permitted to disclaim the covenant
of good faith but they are free, within reasonable limits at least, to
agree upon the standards by which application of the covenant is to be
measured. In such contracts, it may be difficult to distinguish be-
tween breach of the covenant and breach of contract, and there is the
risk that interjecting tort remedies will intrude upon the expectations
of the parties. This is not to say that tort remedies have no place in
such a commercial contex but that it is wise to proceed with caution
in determining their scope and application.
Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at -, 686 P.2d at 1166-67, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362-63 (foot-
note omitted and emphasis added).
62. Since the Seaman's decision was handed down, the California appel-
late courts have been struggling with the new tort of bad faith denial of con-
tract. In Quigley v. Pet, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 3d 223, 208 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1984),
Quigley, an independent trucker, alleged that Pet wrongfully rescinded its
contract with Quigley to haul nuts and then invited Quigley to enter a new
contract at a much lower rate. Pet countered by alleging that Quigley had
misrepresented the proper rate in the original contract. Id. at -, 208 Cal.
Rptr. at 396-97. At trial, the jury awarded Quigley $592,800 in compensatory
damages and $3.8 million in punitive damages for tortious breach of the im-
plied covenant of good faith, even though Quigley had asked for only $2 mil-
lion in punitive damages. Id. at -, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 398. The court stressed
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have openly rejected tort remedies for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith in the commercial context because the
special factors justifying tort liability in the insurance context
are inapplicable in the commercial setting.
II. INAPPLICABILITY IN THE COMMERCIAL CONTEXT
OF THE POLICIES SUPPORTING TORT
LIABILITY FOR BAD FAITH BREACH
OF CONTRACT
In fashioning a cause of action for tortious breach of the
implied covenant of good faith in insurance cases, courts have
emphasized three distinguishing characteristics of the insurance
context that justify the more onerous tort remedies for breach
the narrowness of the Seaman's opinion but noted the uncertainty it produced
in a case such as Quigley:
The decision to rescind a contract recognizes the contract [sic] exist-
ence, and threatens its survival. Is the Seaman's tort limited to a de-
nial that a contract has ever existed? Does it include a party's
unfounded denial that a contract now exists? Assuming the contract
[sic] existence is acknowledged, do disputes over its terms and per-
formance become tortious because the party "doth protest too much"?
Id at __, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 403 (emphasis in original). The Quigley court
strongly suggested that because of the inherent uncertainties in interpreting
contracts, the parties should be given the benefit of the doubt when they
merely dispute the terms of the contract instead of denying its existence. See
id Nonetheless, the court remanded for a new trial in light of the new Sea-
man's tort since when Pet rescinded the contract, it informed Quigley's bank
that no contract existed. The issue on remand is whether that denial was in
bad faith. Id at -, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
Another post-Seaman's case, Rulon-Miller v. IBM, 162 Cal. App. 3d 241,
208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984), confirmed the fears of the court in Quigley that con-
flicts over contract terms could turn into tort actions. Rulon-Miller claimed
that IBM committed a tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith by
terminating her employment because of her romantic relationship with an em-
ployee of a competitor. Although the court in Seaman's suggested that tort li-
ability for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing might
be appropriate in the employment context, see Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d 752, -,
686 P.2d 1158, 1166 & n.6, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 362 & n.6, the Rulon-Milier court
tried to mold the plaintiff's case into the tort of bad faith denial of contract,
see Rulon-Miller, 162 Cal. App. 3d at -, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 532-33. Although the
defendant in Rulon-Miller did not deny the existence of the employment con-
tract, it did deny that certain rights existed under the contract. Id. at -, 208
Cal. Rptr. at 533. The court's application of Seaman's in this context exempli-
fies the danger recognized by the court in Quigley of "convert[ing] routine
contract cases into contract-tort jury trials." Quigley, 162 Cal. App. 3d at -,
208 Cal. Rptr. at 403. For a more accurate application of the Seaman's reason-
ing, see Wallis v. Kroehler Mfg. Co., 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, -, 207 Cal. Rptr.
123, 127-29 (1984) (applying special factors from the insurance context to the
employment context in order to determine whether a breach of the implied
covenant of good faith was tortious).
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of the implied covenant of good faith: the quasi-public-service
nature of the insurance industry, the use of adhesion contracts
resulting from the disproportionate bargaining power of the in-
surer over the insured, and the fiduciary quality of the insurer's
relationship with the insured.63 Similar characteristics have
motivated courts to extend tort liability and punitive damages
for either breach of the implied covenant of good faith or some
analogous cause of action to the employment 64 and consumers 5
63. See Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 819-20, 620 P.2d
141, 145-46, 169 Cal. Rptr 691, 695-96 (1979); Graham & Luck, The Continuing
Development of the Tort of Bad Faith in Montana, 45. MoNT. L. Rsv. 43, 45-47
(1984); Louderback & Jurika, supra note 29, at 196-202.
64. The California Supreme Court has acknowledged that a tort action for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith might be appropriate in the em-
ployment context but elected not to decide the issue. See Tameny v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 179 n.12, 610 P.2d 1330, 1337 n12, 164 Cal. Rptr.
839, 846 n.12 (1980). In Seaman's the court expressly mentioned the employ-
ment context as one having "similar characteristics" to the insurance context
and "deserving of similar legal treatment." Seaman's 36 Cal. 3d at -, 686
P.2d at 1166 & n.6, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362 & n.6.
Appellate courts in California, however, have held that there is an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment contracts, the breach of
which may give rise to tort liability and punitive damages. See, e.g., Wallis v.
Kroehler Mfg. Co., 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, -, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123, 128-29 (1984)
(holding that a cause of action for tortious breach of the implied covenant of
good faith is available when employer stopped payments without cause under
an agreement not to compete); Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152
Cal. App. 3d 467, 479, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613, 619 (1984) (assuming that California
recognizes the tort cause of action but finding that plaintiff failed to allege
facts sufficient to show that defendant acted in bad faith); Smithers v. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 139 Cal. App. 3d 643, -, 189 Cal. Rptr. 20, 23-24
(1983) (approving punitive damages award of $2 million, at least part of which
was attributable to the employer's breach of the implied covenant of good
faith, when employer threatened to blacklist employee unless he gave up his
contract rights), retransferred, - Cal. 3d -. , 696 P.2d 82, 211 Cal. Rptr. 690
(1985); Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 456, 168 CaL Rptr.
722, 729 (1980) (alternative holding) (finding that employee stated cause of ac-
tion for breach of the implied covenant of good faith, making available puni-
tive damages, because employer arbitrarily dismissed employee after many
years of service despite existing procedures for dismissal); see also Cancellier
v. Federated Dept. Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1318-19 (9th Cir. 1982) (applying Cali-
fornia law on a pendent contract claim to uphold an award of punitive dam-
ages in a case in which employer arbitrarily dismissed employee in
contravention of employer's personnel policy), cert denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982);
cf. Rulon-Miller v. IBM, 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, -, 208 Cal Rptr. 524, 532-33
(1984) (relying on the Seaman's tort of bad faith denial of contract rather than
the tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith in affirming award to
employee of compensatory and punitive damages). See generally Louderback
& Jurika, supra note 29, at 211-15 (analyzing California cases discussing the
breach of the implied covenant in the employment context).
The Montana Supreme Court has recognized a cause of action for the tor-
tious breach of the implied covenant of good faith in the employment context,
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contexts. Although the facts in Seaman's provide an appealing
holding that an employer could breach the covenant by failing to follow the
procedures described in an employee handbook for discharging employees. See
Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 196 Mont. 178, 184, 638 P.2d 1063, 1067 (1981);
see also Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., - Mont. -, -, 668 P.2d 213, 216 (1983)
(on appeal after remand, upholding award of $1,891 in compensatory damages
and reinstating award of $50,000 in punitive damages for the tortious breach of
the implied covenant of good faith). The Montana Supreme Court, however,
may be narrowing its approach in the employment context. In Dare v. Mon-
tana Petroleum Marketing Co., - Mont. -, 687 P.2d 1015 (1984), the court
held that tort liability for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing would be available only if the employer's representations created a
reasonable belief that the employee had job security and would not be dis-
charged without cause. See id. at -, 687 P.2d at 1020.
One court in Illinois has expressly refused to recognize the existence of an
action for tortious breach of the implied covenant in the employment context.
See Martin v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 109 Ill. App. 3d 596, 606, 440 N.E.2d 998,
1006 (1982).
For a general discussion of the implied covenant of good faith and related
theories of wrongful discharge, see Lopatka, The Emerging Law of Wrongful
Discharge-A Quadrennial Assessment of the Labor Law Issue of the 80s, 40
Bus. LAW. 1, 17-26 (1984).
65. Most of the insurance cases cited supra notes 28-29, 46 & 59 can be
characterized as consumer cases since the insureds generally were not savvy
businesspersons. Moreover, as in many consumer contracts, the terms in in-
surance contracts are highly standardized and often confusing. See, e.g.,
Schmidt v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 268 Cal. App. 2d 735, 737, 74 Cal. Rptr.
367, 368 (1969). Even though courts use a variety of approaches to impose tort
liability and punitive damages on a dominant party that breaches a noninsur-
ance consumer contract, the actions considered tortious are similar in sub-
stance to those constituting a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in the insurance context.
Indiana courts, for example, have allowed punitive damages in insurance
cases for "oppressive breach of contract" rather than under the rubric of
breach of the implied covenant of good faith. See Vernon Fire & Cas. Ins. Co.
v. Sharp, 161 Ind. App. 413, 416, 316 N.E.2d 381, 384 (1974), modified on other
grounds, 264 Ind. 599, 349 N.E.2d 173 (1976). Some Indiana courts apply the
same theory of oppressive breach of contract to consumer contracts. In Jones
v. Abriani, 169 Ind. App. 556, 350 N.E.2d 635 (1976), a young married couple
purchased a mobile home from a local dealer. After the seller delivered the
home, the couple soon discovered both major and minor defects in the home's
construction. The sellers refused to return the couple's deposit and made no
attempt to fix most of the defects. Id. at 560-63, 350 N.E.2d at 639-40. The
Jones court upheld a punitive damages award against the seller. See id. at 579,
350 N.E.2d at 641. In Jerry Alderman Ford Sales, Inc. v. Bailey, 154 Ind. App.
632, 291 N.E.2d 92 (1972), the court held that the plaintiffs allegation that the
defendant car dealership was guilty of oppressive conduct in failing to return
the truck she had left for repair was sufficient to support an award of punitive
damages. See id. at 639, 291 N.E.2d at 98. In neither Jones nor Jerry Alder-
man Ford did the court link the award of punitive damages to a clearly dis-
cernable tort, such as fraud. In contrast, the court in Hibschman Pontiac, Inc.
v. Batchelor, 340 N.E.2d 377 (Ind. App. 1976), affd in part, rev'd in part, 266
Ind. 310, 362 N.E.2d 845 (1977), held that an oppressive breach of contract, un-
accompanied by an independent tort, does not warrant punishment through
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case for an award of damages more generous than those typi-
cally recoverable under contract law,6 the Seaman's court
should not have extended tort liability to a breach of the im-
plied covenant of good faith on those facts because only the
first of the three characteristics justifying such an extension in
the insurance context-the public interest element-applies in
the fuel dealership context.
The public interest justification 6 for extending tort liabil-
the award of punitive damages. See id at 379-80; see also Standard Land Corp.
v. Borgardus, 154 Ind. App. 283, 313, 289 N.E.2d 803, 820 (1972) (refusing to
sanction award of punitive damages for oppressive breach of a commercial con-
tract in the absence of fraud). On the appeal of Hibschman, however, the In-
diana Supreme Court took a broad reading of the facts and found some
evidence of fraud, malice, or oppression "mingled into" the claim of breach of
warranty;, hence, punitive damages could be awarded as long as their deterrent
effect served the public interest. See Hibschman Pontiac, Inc. v. Batehelor, 266
Ind. 310, 314-15, 362 N.E.2d 845, 847-48 (1977). Because Hibschman involved
overreaching by a car dealer against a consumer, it is unclear whether the In-
diana Supreme Court would impose punitive damages in a commercial con-
tract negotiated at arm's length. See generally Note, supra note 59, at 681-89
(analyzing Indiana's tort of oppressive breach of contract).
Other jurisdictions also give consumers special protection by applying
legal theories analogous to the tortious breach of the implied covenant of good
faith. Idaho's approach is similar to Indiana's theory of oppressive breach of
contract. In Boise Dodge, Inc. v. Clark, 92 Idaho 902, 453 P.2d 551 (1969), the
Idaho Supreme Court upheld a punitive damages award against an automobile
dealer who turned back the odometer on a demonstrator car before selling it.
The court stated that it did not matter whether the action sounded in tort or
contract; punitive damages would be awarded if the dealer acted with fraud,
malice, or oppression or if there was any other satisfactory reason for award-
ing them. See id. at 907, 453 P.2d at 556. Similarly, South Carolina has a broad
definition of fraud that includes "unfair dealing." See Sullivan v. Calhoun, 117
S.C. 137, 139, 108 S.E. 189, 189 (1921). The South Carolina Supreme Court has
used this expansive definition in upholding a punitive damages award against
an insurer that fraudulently canceled an insured's life and health policy. See
Wright v. Public Sav. Life Ins. Co., 262 S.C. 285, 289, 204 S.E.2d 57, 59 (1974).
See generally Note, Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract in South Caro-
lina, 10 S.C.L.Q. 444 (1958) (analyzing liberal South Carolina rule for granting
punitive damages in contract cases). Finally, in Morrow v. L.A. Goldschmidt,
Assocs., Inc., 126 M. App. 3d 1089, 468 N.E.2d 414 (1984), in which the owners
of new townhomes sued the designer, builder, and sellers after they refused to
repair serious defects in plaintiffs' new homes, an Illinois appellate court held
that willful and wanton misconduct is an independent tort that will support an
award of punitive damages based on a breach of contract. See id. at -, 468
N.E.2d at 419-20.
66. The facts in Seaman's were extreme-a small company versus a cor-
porate giant, heavy reliance by the smaller company, an unforeseeable oil
shortage, and alleged dilatory tactics by the corporate giant responsible for the
ruin of the smaller company. See supra notes 1-12 and accompanying text.
67. One of the earliest exceptions to the rule that punitive damages are
unavailable in a contract action developed for "public service" industries, such
as common carriers and public utilities. Sullivan, supra note 25, at 223-226.
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ity to breaches of the implied covenant of good faith was pres-
ent in Seaman's because of the importance of an orderly
distribution of fuel through dealer supply contracts. Although
the oil industry does not share the quasi-public-service status of
the insurance business, it is permeated by government regula-
tion embodying a strong public interest in protecting petroleum
dealers against exploitation by suppliers that enjoy a superior
bargaining position.68 Of all franchisees, petroleum dealers
have received the most extensive protection from the courts. 9
That the actions underlying the litigation in Seaman's took
place during the oil crisis of the early 1970's, when the fair dis-
tribution of limited fuel supplies was a national priority,70 ac-
centuates the importance of the public interest factor in this
case. Nonetheless, the other two factors justifying extension of
tort liability for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
are inapplicable to the facts of Seaman's.
The superior negotiating position Standard enjoyed because
Courts justified this exception by reasoning that punitive damages were neces-
sary to protect against and punish abuses of monopolistic economic power. Id.
at 226.
68. See Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2841 (1982);
H. BROWN, FRANCHIsING: REALITIES AND REMEDIEs § 9.08, at 42 (rev. ed. 1982)
(summarizing state statutes protecting franchisees from termination without
cause).
The existence of extensive legislation designed to protect the weaker
party to a contract is also a characteristic of the employment and consumer
contexts, in which courts have extended tort liability to cases in which the
stronger party has breached the implied covenant of good faith. See supra
notes 64-65. For examples of consumer legislation, see Consumer Credit Pro-
tection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693 (1982); Consumer Product Safety Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 2051-2083 (1982); Consumer Product Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-
2312 (1982). For a summary of legislation protecting, inter alia, employee
health and safety and minimum levels of economic security for the retired and
unemployed, see Note, Protecting At-Will Employees Against Wrongful Dis-
charge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1816,
1827 & nn.63-67 (1980).
69. See Jordan, Unconscionability at the Gas Station, 62 MINN. L. REV.
813, 817, 826-55 (1978). In Shell v. Marinello, 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973),
cert denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1974), the New Jersey Supreme Court, in holding
that a contract term giving Shell the right to terminate the franchise on ten
days' notice was void as against public policy, stressed the public interest in pe-
troleum contracts:
That the public is affected in a direct way [by the contract between
Shell and Marinello] is beyond question. We live in a motor vehicle
age. Supply and distribution of motor fuels are vital to our economy.
In fact, the Legislature has specifically concluded that the distribution
of motor vehicle fuels within this State is affected with a public inter-
est. N.J.S.A. 56:6-19(c).
Id- at 409, 307 A.2d at 602.
70. See authorities cited supra note 7.
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of its size and reputation did not result in a contract of adhe-
sion since the contract lacked essential elements usually identi-
fied as characteristics of adhesion contracts.T1 Unlike the
standardized provisions of adhesion contracts, which typically
are contained in a printed form supplied by the dominant party
to the contract,7 2 the terms of the agreement in Seaman's were
set forth in a letter drafted by Standard at the special request
of Seaman's.73 This document described the particular terms of
the deal Seaman's had carefully negotiated with Standard
71. Professor Todd D. Rakoff has identified seven characteristics of a
"model" adhesion contract- (1) the document is a printed form containing
many terms and is dearly a contract; (2) only one of the parties has drafted
the contract; (3) the drafting party routinely engages in transactions of the
type represented by the form; (4) the drafting party presents the form to the
adhering party with the understanding that although a few terms, such as
price, may be open to negotiation, the drafting party will contract only on its
own terms; (5) after the parties have bargained over whatever terms are open
to negotiation, the adhering party signs the form; (6) the adhering party enters
into far fewer of such contracts than does the drafting party;, and (7) the pri-
mary obligation of the adhering party is to pay money. See Rakoff, Contracts
of Adhesion" An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1174, 1177 (1983).
Rakoff's criteria fit both consumer contracts and at-will employment con-
tracts. Consumer contracts typically are objectionable because they often have
terms weighted heavily in favor of the stronger party buried in fine print.
Meyer, Contracts of Adhesion and the Doctrine of Fundamental Breach, 50
VA. L. REv. 1178,1187 (1964). Yet many employees lack even the protection of
a written contract; employment is a "take-it-or-leave-it proposition" on the
employer's terms. Comment, The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing:
Common Ground for the Torts of Wrongful Discharge from Employmen, 21
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1I1, 1143-44 (1981). Contra Note, Defining Public Pol-
icy Torts in At-Will Dismissals, 34 STAN. L. REV. 153, 165-67 (1981) (arguing
that none of the reasons courts use to justify imposing a tort duty in the insur-
ance context apply to the employment context).
In spite of their inequity, standardized agreements and adhesion contracts
eliminate the enormous transaction costs that would result if each consumer
or employment contract was negotiated individually. Comment, supra, at
1144. Courts are, therefore, reluctant to disturb them but will intervene if the
terms define the rights of the weaker party and the obligations of the stronger
party more narrowly than the weaker party reasonably could have expected.
Id. Rakoff, however, would make any term in an adhesion contract presump-
tively, but not conclusively, unenforceable. See Rakoff, supra, at 1176. More-
over, contrary to most commentators, he would apply adhesion contract
principles to some commercial contracts, see id. at 1253-55, and two of the
three cases he cites to support this position involve service station dealers, see
id. at 1253 n.252. Some courts analogize the inferior bargaining power of pe-
troleum dealers to that of consumers, but the analogy is weak. See Jordan,
supra note 69, at 826, 856 (noting that competent dealers are highly sought af-
ter, have ample bargaining power, and, unlike consumers, are "well-organized
and politically active").
72. See Rakoff, supra note 71, at 1177.
73. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at -, 686 P.2d at 1160, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
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rather than outlining a routine transaction. Moreover, even
though Seaman's was a small company, it bargained extensively
for these terms with several oil companies before signing the
contract with Standard.74 Consequently, although Seaman's
may have been in the weaker bargaining position, this inequal-
ity did not result in the creation of an adhesion contract.
Furthermore, no fiduciary relationship existed between
Seaman's and Standard. When a fiduciary relationship exists,
courts do not permit the stronger party to abuse its power by
promoting its own interests at the expense of the weaker
party.75 Although not subject to precise definition, 76 the label
"fiduciary" is frequently used by courts when they identify par-
74. Three of the factors Rakoff identifies as characteristics of adhesion
contracts, however, were present in Seaman's. See Rakoff, supra note 71, at
1177. Seaman's signed the letter drafted by Standard, Standard had more ex-
perience in making dealership contracts, and the primary obligation of Sea-
man's was to pay money for its oil purchases. See Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at -,
686 P.2d at 1160-61, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 356-57. Yet these three elements seem far
less essential to the existence of an adhesion contract than do the use of a
printed form, drafting done with the input of only the dominant party, the
routine nature of the transaction, and the absence of negotiation over contract
terms.
75. See First Bank of Wakeeney v. Moden, 235 Kan. 260, -, 681 P.2d 11,
13 (1984). Traditionally, fiduciary duties are imposed on trustees, guardians,
executors, attorneys, agents, partners, corporate directors, and corporate of-
ficers. D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 10.4, at 681 (1973).
76. See Sullivan, supra note 25, at 229 n.119 ("Phrases such as fiduciary
relationship, relationship of trust, and confidential relationship are used inter-
changeably by the courts; the definition of these terms is also vague, haphaz-
ard, and fragmentary.") (citation omitted); Comment, supra note 71, at 1147-48
(criticizing the term "fiduciary" as a conclusory expression of the decision that
the law will protect a plaintiff by imposing a higher than usual duty of good
faith). Courts tend to identify fiduciary duties on a case-by-case basis, leading
one commentator to suggest that there is no general definition of a fiduciary
relationship. See Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69, 72-
73.
The most useful procedure in analyzing a potential fiduciary relationship
is to focus on the particular characteristics that inspire courts to label a partic-
ular relationship "fiduciary." In the insurance context, for example, courts
often find that a fiduciary relationship exists when an insurer defends its in-
sured in an action brought by a third party. See Baxter v. Royal Indemnity
Co., 285 So. 2d 652, 656 (Fla. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 317 So. 2d 725 (Fla.
1975). The insurer typically controls all aspects of the litigation, which can be
complex and lengthy. In addition, the insurer has the opportunity to abuse its
position by unreasonably refusing to settle within the insured's policy limit if
it believes that it has any chance of winning the suit. See, e.g., Dumas v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 111 N.H. 43, 46, 274 A.2d 781, 783 (1971). Because
these characteristics are missing in a first-party action, in which the insured
seeks benefits directly from the insurer, some courts have refused to apply the
theory of tortious breach of contract to such cases. See Lawton v. Great S.W.
Fire Ins. Co., 118 N.H. 607, 614, 392 A.2d 576, 580-81 (1978).
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ticular characteristics in a relationship that justify forcing one
party to show a concern for the other party's interests that goes
beyond the duty of good faith.78 Key features of the deal be-
tween Seaman's and Standard, however, negate the existence of
a fiduciary relationship that would require Standard to be par-
ticularly concerned about the welfare of Seaman's. Even
though Seaman's depended heavily on its oil supply contract
with Standard in order to obtain the lease in the new marina79
and Standard had more experience with dealership transac-
tions, Standard possessed no extraordinary knowledge giving it
an unfair advantage over Seaman's in the contract negotiations.
Moreover, Standard did not dominate the operations of Sea-
man's; Seaman's was independently owned, and its marine fuel
dealership was only one facet of its chandlery business80 Most
important, Standard did not purport to act for the benefit of
Seaman's. Seaman's and Standard entered contract negotia-
tions hoping to reach a mutually beneficial agreement, but it
was clear from the start that each party was promoting and
77. Fiduciary qualities include: whether one party acts on behalf of an-
other, Bacon v. Soule, 19 Cal. App. 428, 434, 126 P. 384, 386 (1912); whether one
party dominates another, First Bank of Wakeeney v. Moden, 235 Kan. 260, -,
681 P.2d 11, 13 (1984); whether one party depends heavily on the other, id.;
whether one party has superior business intelligence or knowledge of special
facts giving it an advantage over the other party, id.; and whether the relation-
ship between the parties centers on a complex transaction, Littau v. Midwest
Commodities, Inc., 316 N.W.2d 639, 644 (S.D. 1982).
78. Courts that attempt to distinguish the implied covenant of good faith
from a fiduciary duty usually describe the latter as one of "utmost good faith."
See, e.g., Jones v. Nickell, 297 Ky. 81, 85, 179 S.W.2d 195, 197 (1944). Other
courts merely speak of a fiduciary duty to act in good faith and with due re-
gard to the interests of the one reposing the confidence. See, eg., Rees v. Bris-
coe, 315 P.2d 758, 762 (Okla. 1957).
Some courts inaccurately have merged the concepts of fiduciary duty and
implied covenant of good faith. See Nelson v. Abraham, 29 Cal. 2d 745, 751, 177
P.2d 931, 934 (1947) (defining a fiduciary duty as one requiring that "neither
party... do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the
right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract"); Stevens v.
Marco, 147 Cal. App. 2d 357, 372, 305 P.2d 669, 678 (1956) (noting that a fiduci-
ary duty exists when "the parties are so... associated in a business transac-
tion that one party must rely on the good faith and integrity of the other");
Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 884 (8th Cir. 1979) (applying South
Dakota law to find that "Amoco breached its 'fiduciary' duty of good faith and
fair dealing with Arnott in terminating its lease agreement with Arnott with-
out good cause"), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 918 (1979). But see Bain v. Champlin
Petroleum Co., 692 F.2d 43, 48 (8th Cir. 1982) (commenting that it was unnec-
ssary for the court in Arnott to use the "fiduciary" label in order to find a
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing).
79. Seaman', 36 Cal. 3d at , 686 P.2d at 1160, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
80. Id.
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protecting its own interests.8 ' Standard therefore owed Sea-
man's no duty of fiduciary responsibility.
Thus, despite the particularly egregious facts underlying
Seaman's,82 the absence of an adhesion contract and the lack of
any fiduciary relationship should have precluded the applica-
tion of tort liability to the case. Indeed, although a few courts
have extended tort liability to the banking83 and franchise8 4
contexts for behavior tantamount to breach of the implied cove-
81. See id. at -, 686 P.2d at 1160-61, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 356-57.
82. See supra notes 1-12 and accompanying text.
83. In First Nat'l Bank in Libby v. Twombley, - Mont. -. , 689 P.2d 1226
(1984), the Montana Supreme Court held that a bank committed a tortious
breach of the implied covenant of good faith by unjustifiably accelerating the
maturity date of a promissory note. The court stated that the plaintiffs, a mar-
ried couple that had signed the note to finance a small restaurant, could re-
cover punitive damages if they demonstrated that the bank acted with malice,
fraud, or oppression. See id. at -, 689 P.2d at 1230. In Commercial Cotton Co.
v. United Calif. Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1985), a Califor-
nia appellate court held that the bank was liable for tortious breach of the im-
plied covenant of good faith for negligently debiting the company's account on
a check that contained unauthorized signatures. The court upheld an award of
$4,000 in actual damages and $100,000 in punitive damages for breach of the
implied covenant. See id. at -, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 552-54.
84. In Golf West of Ky. v. Life Investors Co., No-C-138,745 (L.A., Calif.
Super. Ct. July 10, 1980), noted in 30 DEF. L.J. 23 (1981), the defendant termi-
nated without cause an exclusive distributorship contract for a top line of golf
equipment after the plaintiff spent two and one-half years and a substantial
amount of money to establish and staff pro shops and retail outlets. The jury
awarded compensatory damages of $2,524,387 and punitive damages of
$6,510,000 for tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith. See id. at
23.
In Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. de-
nied, 445 U.S. 917 (1979), a federal court extended to the franchise context In-
diana's tort of oppressive breach of contract, which is similar to tortious breach
of the implied covenant of good faith. See supra note 65. The court upheld an
award of punitive damages against the defendant franchisor that had tried to
ruin the franchisee's business in order to force it to resell its franchise to the
franchisor at a reduced rate. See Photovest; 606 F.2d at 727-30. The court in
Photovest, however, may have been mistaken in extending Indiana law to this
sort of arms-length business relationship. In Standard Land Corp. v. Bogar-
dus, 154 Ind. App. 283, 289 N.E.2d 803 (1972), Standard and Macke Homes were
part of a joint venture in which Standard was to build a golf course and Macke
was to build homes for a residential development. The trial court found that
Standard's efforts to coerce Macke into buying the golf course indicated "a
spirit of wanton disregard for the rights of Macke." Id. at 313, 289 N.E.2d at
820 (quoting the trial court). But the appellate court, noting the absence of
any finding of fraud, reversed the trial court's award of punitive damages. See
id.; see also Note, supra note 59, at 683 (arguing that Standard was correctly
decided on appeal since the case was not a "typical consumer oppression case"
but rather "a rough and tumble businessman situation in which. . . the court
should be slow to punish").
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nant of good faith, the policy reasons supporting tort liability
for breach of this implied covenant in the insurance context do
not apply to these contexts either.85 Nevertheless, the rela-
tively paltry amount of contract damages awarded in Sea-
man's16 indicates that it may be necessary to modify traditional
theories of contract damages to prevent undercompensation in
85. The results in banking and franchise cases, like that in Seaman's, have
initial appeal. The public interest factor in the banking industry and franchise
contracts is evident from the degree of statutory regulation of these areas. See,
e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 1-3805 (1982) (title setting forth federal banking laws); H.
BROWN, supra note 68, § 9.08, at 42 (summarizing state statutes protecting
franchisees from termination without cause). If one uses a broad definition of
adhesion contract, see Raskoff, supra note 71, at 1253-55, some contracts used
by banks and franchisors could be classified as adhesion contracts. Nonethe-
less, the relationship between a bank and its customers or a franchisor and its
franchisees lacks fiduciary characteristics. Unless a bank acts as a trustee, a
traditional fiduciary relationship, courts generally have held that it does not
owe a customer a fiduciary duty. See, eg., Aaron Ferer & Sons v. Chase
Manhatten Bank, 731 F.2d 112, 122 (2nd Cir. 1984); First Bank of Wakeeney v.
Moden, 235 Kan. 260, -, 681 P.2d 11, 13 (1984). Nor does a franchisor owe a
franchisee a fiduciary duty. See, eg., Picture Lake Campground v. Holiday
Inns, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 858, 869 (E.D. Va. 1980) (although franchisor owed a
duty of good faith to franchisee, it did not owe a fiduciary duty); Chmieleski v.
City Prods. Corp.; 660 S.W.2d 275, 294-95 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (existence of a
franchisor-franchisee relationship does not give rise to a fiduciary relation-
ship). But see Brown, Franchising-A Fiduciary Relationship, 49 TEx. L.
REv. 650, 664-65 (1971) (arguing that many fiduciary qualities exist in the
franchisor-franchisee relationship). Even though the bank-customer and
franchisor-franchisee relationships are characterized by trust and reliance on
the stronger party, in both contexts the parties, like those in Seaman',, are
seeking their own profits; the stronger party does not purport to act in the in-
terest of the weaker party. See Bain v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 692 F.2d 43,
47 (8th Cir. 1982) ("[A]Ithough the existence of trust and confidence in an-
other is inherent in all fiduciary relationships, its mere presence does not suf-
fice to automatically make either party to a business relationship ... a
fiduciary in every aspect of that relationship."); Arnott v. American Oil Co.,
609 F.2d 873, 891 (8th Cir. 1979) (Bright, J., dissenting) ('The parties in this
case entered into a business relationship, not a fiduciary relationship. Each
party served the interests of the other, but each also quite properly sought its
own interests."), cert denied, 446 U.S. 918 (1980).
One court has called the banker-customer relationship "quasi-fiduciary"
because of the customer's heavy dependence on and trust in the bank. See
Commercial Cotton Co. v. United Calif. Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, -, 209
Cal. Rptr. 551, 554 (1985). One might also call the franchisor-franchisee rela-
tionship quasi-fiduciary because of the presence of a similar degree of depen-
dence and trust. Yet the concept of a special quasi-fiduciary duty is
unnecessary. The law already implies a covenant of good faith and fair dealing
to remedy situations in which one contracting party is injured because the
other contracting party, on whom it has depended to secure the benefits of the
contract, refuses to cooperate. See Farnsworth, supra note 21, at 672.
86. The jury awarded Seaman's only $397,050 for breach of contract Sea-
man's, 36 Cal. 3d at -_, 686 P.2d at 1162, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
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certain cases involving bad faith breaches of commercial
contracts.
III. A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO REMEDIES FOR
BAD FAITH BREACH OF CONTRACT
The California Supreme Court's decision in Seaman's to
create a new tort for bad faith denial of contract may in part
reflect the court's belief that traditional contract damages pro-
vide inadequate compensation in many situations involving
breach of the implied covenant of good faith. Seaman's, for ex-
ample, would have been undercompensated had its recovery
been limited to ordinary contract damages because of the high
cost of litigation and the difficulty of proving lost profits of a
new business. The availability of punitive damages under a tort
theory of recovery, in Seaman's totaling roughly twenty-eight
times the actual damages for breach of contract,87 more than
makes up for these problems. However, three of the four tradi-
tional rationales for granting punitive damages--encouraging
litigation by "private attorneys general," deterring malicious,
fraudulent, and oppressive acts, and punishing defendants that
have committed such acts-do not apply in the commercial con-
text. The one rationale that is relevant to a case like Seaman's,
the need to offset expenses like attorney's fees that are not
otherwise recoverable, is better addressed by functional modifi-
cations of the traditional rules of contract damages than by ex-
tension of tort remedies.
The "bounty," or private attorney general, rationale for
granting punitive damages reflects the desire to encourage po-
tential plaintiffs to sue defendants who have harmed many peo-
ple but who are not likely to be sued because the relatively
meager compensatory damages available do not justify the time
and expense of litigation.88 Although this rationale is particu-
larly applicable in such traditional areas of public interest as in-
87. The jury awarded $11,058,810 in punitive damages for tortious breach
of the implied covenant of good faith. Id
88. See D. DOBBS, supra note 75, § 3.9, at 205; K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAM.
AGES § 7.6(D), at 629-30 (1980). In Chodos v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 126 Cal.
App. 3d 81, 178 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1981), the court noted that the insurer's practice
of using a photograph to appraise the damage to the insured's car and paying
only the amount of that appraisal affected all of its insureds. See id. at 104,
178 Cal. Rptr. at 841. The plaintiff in Chwdos, who received $200,000 in puni-
tive damages but only $146.71 in compensatory damages, id. at 90, 178 Cal.
Rptr. at 833, probably would not have sued without the attraction of punitive
damages.
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surance, consumer, and employment contracts,8 9 it does not
carry the same force in the commercial context because com-
mercial entities typically do not need an additional financial in-
centive to litigate. Businesses already sue each other
frequently,90 and the sums involved generally create a suffi-
cient incentive to litigate. In Seanan's, for example, the plain-
tiff was unlikely simply to ignore a $400,000 breach of contract
claim even if punitive damages were unavailable.
Deterrence of future misbehavior 9 ' also is a less persuasive
rationale for granting punitive damages in the commercial con-
text than it is in other areas because the societal cost of that
deterrence may be greater than its value. If defendants like
Standard are forced to pay punitive damages for tortiously de-
nying the existence of a contract, they probably will treat the
punitive damage award as just another cost of doing business.
Although such companies might suffer a decrease in profits,
some of the cost will be passed on to consumers in the form of
higher prices as long as the companies can remain competi-
tive.9 2 Additional consumer costs may be justifiable in areas
such as products liability and insurance, employment, and con-
sumer contracts, in which public policy favors extra protection
against health and safety hazards or the dangers of exploita-
tion. Deterring bad faith breaches of commercial contracts,
however, may not be worth the same substantial investment of
society's resources. 93
The rationale of punishing immoral or harmful behavior-4
89. See Chodos v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 126 Cal. App. 3d 81, 104, 178
Cal. Rptr. 829, 841 (1981); D. DOBBS, supra note 75, § 3.9, at 205.
90. See Miller, The Adversary System Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L
REV. 1, 6-7, 9-11 (1984).
91. See K. REDDEN, supra note 88, § 7.6(B), at 628. Ordinary contract
damages may not deter breach because even if found liable, the defendant
would have to pay only the amount it owed the plaintiff under the terms of
the contract. See Diamond, supra note 30, at 440; cf Ellis, Fairness and Effi-
ciency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL L. REv. 1, 9 (1982) (ques-
tioning the deterrent value of punitive damages in tort cases).
92. See Peters, Punitive Damages in Oregon, 18 WILUMErTE .= REv. 369,
420-21 (1982). Because the oil business is highly sensitive to price changes,
Standard could not raise its oil price significantly to compensate for a punitive
damages award, but in a less volatile industry price increases would be a prob-
able consequence of large punitive damages awards.
93. See Hibschman Pontiac, Inc. v. Batchelor, 340 N.E.2d 377, 380 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1976) (noting that "in the case of outrageous tortious conduct, the use of
punitive damages to deter such conduct in the future may be justified to fur-
ther society's interest in the public health and safety," but refusing to extend
the availability of punitive damages to contract actions).
94. See K. REDDEN, supra note 88, § 7.6(A), at 625-27.
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similarly fails to support awarding punitive damages for bad
faith breach of contract in the commercial context. A business
promise broken maliciously may be ethically offensive, but it
traditionally has not been the kind of behavior that society
punishes. 95 Moreover, punishing behavior that has not clearly
been labeled illicit reduces the predictability of risks, an essen-
tial element of smooth commercial transactions.9 6 For exam-
ple, since the Seaman's decision, Standard Oil can no longer be
certain how strenuously it may deny the existence of a contract
without suffering an award of punitive damages. It can only
guess what behavior a jury would find amounts to malice,
fraud, or oppression.97 This ad hoc determination of "guilt" is
fraught with potential uncertainty and unfairness, and it under-
mines the predictability of commercial risks during contract
95. Indeed, some state statutes protect the breaching party by prohibiting
punitive damages. See, e.g., CALIF. CIv. CODE § 3294 (West 1979); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 27-1-221 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-07 (1976); see also Brown-
Marx Assocs., Ltd. v. Emigrant Say. Bank, 527 F. Supp. 277, 282-83 (N.D. Ala.
1981) (noting the strong public interest in insurance industry regulation in re-
fusing to extend the bad faith tort from insurance contracts to consumer con-
tracts). The court in Hibschman Pontiac, Inc. v. Batchelor, 340 N.E.2d 377
(Ind. Ct. App. 1976), explained its decision not to extend punitive damages to a
commercial context:
We do not agree that "... [a] breach of contract is a wrong as much
as a tort.". . . Even in cases of unjustified intentional breach of con-
tract unaccompanied by tortious conduct, we do not believe that the
'wrong' involved is a wrong warranting the intrusion of punitive dam-
ages into a private transaction. The threat of punitive damages should
not be allowed to chill the assertion of a valid contract dispute or to
foreclose a contracting party from breaching a contract he no longer
desires to consummate.
Id at 380 (citation omitted). This hesitancy to punish the breaching party is
also embodied in the traditional rule prohibiting liquidated damages that are
disguised penalties for breach. See Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penal-
ties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement
Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 554, 555 (1977).
96. See Hibschman Pontiac, Inc. v. Batchelor, 340 N.E.2d 377, 380 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1976) ("Although society has an interest in the smooth operation of com-
mercial transactions, we do not believe that this interest should be furthered
by subjecting the private parties to the uncertainty of punitive damages."); cf.
Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the Common Law of Punitive Dam-
ages, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 133, 134 n.6 (1982) (noting the great bargaining power
that even a weak punitive damages claim gives a negotiator in settlement
talks).
97. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing the standard for
an award of punitive damages). Although a judge has the power to reduce an
outrageous punitive damages award, the jury generally has great latitude in
determining whether to award punitive damages at all. See Ellis, supra note
91, at 39.
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and settlement negotiations.9
The only rationale for punitive damages that retains its
force in the commercial context is the need to alleviate the un-
dercompensation that results from limits on other available
remedies. This argument traditionally has been framed in the
context of the need to provide reimbursement for litigation ex-
penses in order to make the plaintiff whole;9 indeed, a plaintiff
that incurs substantial legal fees in enforcing its rights under a
contract but recovers only ordinary contract damages is not put
in the same position it would have been in had the contract
been performed1 ° ° Punitive damages also may prevent un-
dercompensation from other restrictive aspects of traditional
contract remedies, such as the requirements of certainty of
damges and foreseeability of loss.1 0 ' That traditional contract
remedies may undercompensate plaintiffs like Seaman's, how-
ever, does not justify the creation of a new tort in order to pro-
vide additional compensation through punitive damages.
Rather, courts should address the undercompensation issue di-
rectly to determine what modifications of traditional contract
remedies are appropriate in light of the facts of each case of
breach of the implied covenant of good faith. 0 2
Determining what modifications in traditional contract
remedies are justified in the context of a bad faith breach of a
commercial contract requires an examination of the types of be-
98. This is especially apparent when one considers the power a punitive
damages claim gives the plaintiff in settlement negotiations. Because the pos-
sibility and extent of punishment is uncertain, the defendant faced with even a
weak punitive damages claim may agree to an unfavorable settlement. See
Schwartz, supra note 96, at 134 n.6.
99. See D. DOBBS, supra note 75, § 3.9, at 221; K. REDDEN, supra note 88,
§ 7.6(C), at 628-29.
100. See Hibschman Pontiac, Inc. v. Batchelor, 340 N.E.2d 377, 380 (Ind. Ct
App. 1976) (observing that "[w]ith the exception of recovery of attorney fees,
the aggrieved party has an adequate remedy in the recovery of compensatory
damages" for oppressive breach of contract).
101. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
102. See Marschall, Willfulness: A Crucial Factor In Choosing Remedies
for Breach of Contrac4 24 AIZ. L. REV. 733, 759 n. 126 (1982) ('Those who
conclude that this embryonic tort [of bad faith breach of contract] should be
aborted may decide that developing remedial principles for breach of contract
which more fully protect plaintiffs' expectancy interests would decrease ef-
forts by plaintiff's attorneys to transform contract breaches into torts."); c.
Schwartz, supra note 96 at 139-140 ("If it is true that existing damage rules fail
to comprehend significant elements of harm that torts are likely to produce,
the proper strategy entails reforming or revising those damage rules directly,
rather than straining for a surrogate result through reliance on punitive
damages.").
1985] 1189
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
havior encompassed by the label "bad faith." Admittedly, it
would be virtually impossible, as well as undesirable, 0 3 to cata-
logue the multifarious varieties of bad faith in commercial deal-
ings. 0 4 Nevertheless, there seems to be a common theme in
cases involving a breach of the implied covenant of good faith
that finds expression in Restatement (Second) of Contracts:
"Good faith performance or enforcement of a contract empha-
sizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consis-
tency with the justified expectations of the other party
.... "105 In almost all instances of bad faith, the defendant has
taken advantage of the technicalities of contract law by adher-
ing to the letter, but not the spirit, of the contract. 0 6 In deter-
mining what conduct contitutes bad faith, courts typically take
a functional approach in that they look to the purpose of the
103. No listing of types of bad faith should purport to be definitive, for the
strength of concepts such as "good faith" is their deliberate elasticity, their ca-
pacity to be "developed by the courts in light of unforeseen and new circum-
stances and practices." U.C.C § 1-102 comment 1 (1978).
104. See Summers, supra note 21, at 206. Some commentators have devel-
oped standards or guides that rely on the concept of economic efficiency to
identify bad faith. According to Professor Thomas A. Diamond, a party com-
mits a tortious breach of the implied covenant "if it can be established that at
the time of wilful breach the promisor could not have reasonably believed his
gains would exceed the promisee's compensable pecuniary losses." Diamond,
supra note 30, at 448. Professor Steven J. Burton, by comparison, has stated
that "[b]ad faith performance occurs precisely when discretion is used to re-
capture opportunities foregone upon contracting." Burton, Breach of Contract
and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARv. L. REv. 322,
369 (1980). Although these standards are useful tools for arguing that a partic-
ular breach is in bad faith, they do not provide a comprehensive definition. Di-
amond, for example, finds it necessary to carve out numerous exceptions to his
standard. See Diamond, supra note 30, at 452-53. Standard's breach would be
in bad faith under both the Diamond and Burton tests. Standard could not
reasonably have believed that its gains from reallocating to other customers
the oil Seaman's was slated to receive would have exceeded the compensable
losses of Seaman's, especially since Standard felt compelled to deny the exist-
ence of a contract in order to avoid liability for breach. In addition, Standard
used the uncertainty of the open terms of the contract to deny its existence,
thereby using its discretion to reallocate the oil in time of shortage. By reallo-
cating the oil, Standard essentially recaptured an opportunity it had foregone
when contracting with Seaman's.
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 comment a (1981).
106. Professor Robert S. Summers observes that bad faith breaches occur,
for example, when: (1) a seller conceals a defect in what he is selling; (2) a
builder willfully fails to perform in full, though otherwise substantially per-
forming, (3) a contractor openly abuses bargaining power to coerce an increase
in the contract price; (4) a party hires a broker and then deliberately prevents
the broker from consummating the deal; (5) a party demonstrates a conscious
lack of diligence in mitigating the other party's damages; (6) a party termi-
nates a contract without reason; (7) a party uses an overreaching interpreta-
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contract and measure "bad faith" according to the parties' rea-
sonable expectations.Lo°
This functional approach is just as applicable to the deter-
mination of an appropriate remedy as it is to the determination
of what constitutes bad faith; if the defendant's act violates the
spirit of the contract, courts should look to that spirit in shap-
ing a remedy. Although it may be inappropriate to punish a de-
fendant that breaches in bad faith 08 the defendant should not
be allowed to benefit from technical limitations on contract
remedies at the plaintiff's expense. Thus, when a defendant
breaches the implied covenant of good faith, courts should de-
part from the traditional limitations on contract damages when-
ever necessary to protect the spirit of the contract as reflected
in the plaintiff's reasonable expectations. 109 Of course, a differ-
ent "package" of damages would be required depending on the
facts of the particular case and any statutory limitations on
damages in force in the particular jurisdiction.10 This func-
tion of the terms of the contract; (8) one party harasses the other for repeated
assurances of performance. See Summers, supra note 21, at 203.
Summers proposes a substitute version of U.C.C. § 1-203 that would reflect
the objective quality of these examples of bad faith:
Section 1-203. Obligation of Good Faith
(1) From the negotiation to discharge of contracts or duties this Act
governs, parties shall act in good faith.
(2) For purposes of subsection (1), "good faith" rules out all relevant
breaches of faith, e.g., abusing the privilege to withdraw an offer,
taking unfair advantage, evading the spirit of a contract, conjur-
ing up a dispute to force a favorable modification, abusing a
power to terminate a contractual relation.
Ic- at 215 n.73.
107. For an example of this functional approach in identifying bad faith
breaches of insurance contracts, see supra note 47.
108. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
109. See Farnsworth, supra note 53, at 1209 (suggesting willfulness of
breach as one factor in deciding whether to relax foreseeability rule); Sum-
mers, supra note 21, at 253, 256 (arguing that the traditional foreseeability
rules should be relaxed and tort damages permitted in cases involving a bad
faith breach of contract). Professor Daniel A. Farber argues that "supercom-
pensatory" damages are appropriate for bad faith breach of contract. See Far-
ber, Reassessing the Economic Efficiency of Compensatory Damages for
Breaches of Contrac 66 VA. L. REV. 1443, 1445-47 (1980). Farber defines
"supercompensatory" damages as the amount of damages awarded in excess of
the amount necessary to put the plaintiff in the same position he or she would
have been in had the contract been performed. Supercompensatory damages,
although they have a penalty element, are not the same as punitive damages.
See id. at 1445 n.14. Farber contends that supercompensatory damages may be
more economically efficient than ordinary contract damages since supercom-
pensatory damages provide an optimal level of deterrence and compensation.
See id. at 1445.
110. California, for example, has a procedural rule providing that, unless
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tional approach to bad faith breach of contract and its remedies
can be illustrated using the facts of Seaman's.
The litigation expenses Seaman's incurred should have
been recoverable because of Standard's bad faith in repudiating
the contract. By using the indefiniteness of the contract terms
to deny that any contract existed, an argument that the Califor-
nia Supreme Court rejected summarily,"' Standard attempted
to deprive Seaman's of its opportunity to collect adequate com-
pensation for breach of contract, one of the basic expectations
of any contract. 112 Because Seaman's could not have antici-
pated the need to initiate litigation to prove the existence of a
contract, its "package" of damages should have included an
award of attorney's fees and litigations costs.1 3 Indeed, some
jurisdictions already provide for fee shifting when an oppo-
nent's legal action is unjustified, 114 and even jurisdictions with
statutory restrictions on awards of attorney's fees often provide
provided by statute, payment of attorney's fees is left to the agreement of the
parties. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021 (West 1980). The California
Supreme Court, however, recently upheld an award of attorney's fees result-
ing from a bad faith breach of an insurance contract, reasoning that attorney's
fees incurred to obtain the benefits due under an insurance contract were
damages proximately caused by the insurer's tortious conduct. See Brandt v.
Standard Ins. Co., 37 Cal. 3d 813, -, 693 P.2d 796, 799, 210 Cal. Rptr. 211, 213
(1985). Similar reasoning would seem to apply to Seaman's. If Standard de-
nied the existence of the contract in bad faith, the attorney's fees incurred by
Seaman's to litigate the existence of the contract should be recoverable. If, as
the Brandt court suggests, attorney's fees are recoverable as "damages," it
should not matter, under California law, whether the damages are tort dam-
ages or contract damages. See Brandt, 37 Cal. 3d at -, 693 P.2d at 803 n.1, 210
Cal. Rptr. at 218 n.1 (1985) (Lucas, J., dissenting).
111. See Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d 752, -, 686 P.2d at 1162-63, 206 Cal. Rptr. at
358-59.
112. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
113. The justification for shifting attorney's fees is particularly strong
when the "bad faith" aspect of a defendant's conduct consists of threatening or
dragging out baseless litigation, such as when a defendant frivolously denies
the existence of a contract. See Rowe, The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shift.
ing: A Critical Overview, 1982 DuKE L.J. 651, 658-59, 661; see also W. KEETON,
supra note 31, § 120, at 893 (suggesting that although defendants cannot be lia-
ble for malicious prosecution for proceedings they did not initiate, "[a] bad
faith defense . . . may subject the defendant to liability for attorneys' fees
even when no statute so provides and this may serve to accomplish most of the
purposes of a malicious prosecution action"). The threat of an award of attor-
ney's fees may deter the defendant from presenting any defense it wishes, but
it is not as likely to violate the policy of unfettered access to the courts as is
the threat of a large, unpredictable punitive damages award.
114. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 13-6-11 (Supp. 1984) (permitting shifting of
fees in cases involving bad faith breach of contract); IDAHO R. Civ. P. 54(e)(1)
(authorizing fee shifting if case is "brought, pursued or defended frivolously,
unreasonably or without foundation"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-611 (Smith-
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a common law exception to assess fees against a "vexatious
litigant."" 5
Similarly, the rules requiring reasonably certain proof of
contract damagesn 6 should be relaxed in cases like Seaman's.
The court's use of traditional certainty requirements allowed
Standard to benefit from the difficulties of proof it had created
for Seaman's because Standard's repudiation prevented Sea-
man's from opening its expanded business and thus made it
difficult to prove the amount of lost profits.n 7 One way courts
could relax the certainty requirement in bad faith cases is to
permit the plaintiff to prove its future profits through modern
forecasting methods." 8 For instance, the court could have
awarded damages representing an earnings estimate, reflecting
an average of several possible outcomes, discounted to present
value." 9 Finally, an award of prejudgment interest on that por-
tion of the lost profits accrued as of the date of judgment would
have been appropriate to compensate Seaman's for the lost
time value of money it suffered because of the delay occasioned
by Standard's bad faith breach. 20
Hurd Supp. 1983) (allowing fee shifting when allegations and denials are made
"without reasonable cause and found to be untrue").
115. See; eg., County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles, 78 Cal. App. 3d 82, 92,
144 Cal. Rptr 71, 77-78 (1978) (recognizing the existence of the "vexatious liti-
gant" exception in California but refusing to apply it to the facts at hand).
The federal courts have carved out their own bad faith exception, permit-
ting fee shifting when a party refuses to admit a valid legal claim or engages in
other conduct in litigation amounting to bad faith. See Alyeska Pipeline Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975) (observing that "a court may as-
sess... attorneys' fees ... when the losing party has 'acted in bad faith, vex-
atiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons . .. .") (citations omitted);
Note, Attorney's Fees and the Federal Bad Faith Exception, 29 HASTGS L.J.
319, 323-30 (1977).
116. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
117. For discussions of the difficulty of proving lost profits of a new busi-
ness, see Aldon Indus., Inc. v. Don Myers & Assocs., Inc., 517 F.2d 188,191 (5th
Cir. 1975); Note, supra note 24, at 512-18.
118. See Schiro, Prospecting for Lost Profits in the Uniform Commercial
Code: The Buyer's Dilemmas, 52 S. CAI. L. REV. 1727, 1759 (1979); see also id.
at 1753 (noting that courts often shift the burden of proof as to uncertainty to
the defendant).
119. See Schaefer, Uncertainty and the Law of Damages, 19 Wb.L & MARY
L. REv. 719, 725 (1978); see also Comment, Remedies-Lost Profits as Contract
Damages for Unestablished Businesses The New Business Rule Becomes Out-
dated, 56 N.CJL. REV. 693, 732-33 (1978) (suggesting that an award of damages
in the amount of the most pessimistic forecast is "more consonant with the
policy of reasonable certainty"). The poor performance of Seaman's in its
smaller operation could be reflected in the selection of the discount rate. See
V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSrEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE 43 (2d* ed. 1979)
120. The complexity of the rules on prejudgment interest are beyond the
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If the transaction in Seaman's had not been governed by
article 2 of the UCC,121 the common law rule limiting conse-
quential damages to those foreseeable by the parties at the time
of contracting might have barred recovery of lost profits from
the planned venture between Seaman's and the city of Eu-
reka.122 Standard knew when it contracted with Seaman's that
scope of this Comment, but some courts are becoming more flexible in award-
ing prejudgment interest on unliquidated or disputed damages. See Entron,
Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 749 F.2d 127, 132 (2d Cir. 1984) (applying New
Jersey law in a diversity suit). For discussions of the use of prejudgment in-
terest awards as a means of providing full compensation to defendants, see
Note, Prejudgment Interest- Implementing Its Compensatory Purpose, 15 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 541 (1984); Note, The Minnesota Prejudgment Interest Amend-
ment: An Analysis of the Offer-Counteroffer Provision, 69 MINN. L. REV. -
(1985); Note, Prejudgment Interest" Survey and Suggestions, 77 Nw. U. L. REV.
192 (1982).
Courts also are developing other weapons to combat the undercompensa-
tion produced by ordinary contract damages, and the justifications for these
"extra" damages are even stronger when the breach of contract is in bad faith.
See Gerard v. Almouli, 746 F.2d 936, 939 (2d Cir. 1984) (awarding injunctive re-
lief for breach of the implied covenant of good faith); Goetz & Scott, supra
note 95, at 557-58 (noting increasing approval of liquidated damage clauses);
Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 271 (1979) (ar-
guing that specific performance should be available routinely).
121. See Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at -, 686 P.2d at 1163, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 359
(stating that the contract contemplated a sale of goods governed by the
U.C.C.). Under § 2-715 of the Code, the risk of an unforeseeable inability to
cover falls on the breaching seller. Section 2-715 provides in part:
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements
and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had
reason to know and which could not reasonably be pre-
vented by cover or otherwise ....
U.C.C. § 2-715(2) (1978) (emphasis added).
122. Unlike U.C.C. § 2-715, the common law rule of foreseeabiity seems to
place the risk of an unforeseeable inability either to "cover" or to replace the
breaching party's services on the nonbreaching party. The common law rule is
explained in the Restatement:
If several circumstances have contributed to cause a loss, the party in
breach is not liable for it unless he had reason to foresee all of them.
Sometimes a loss would not have occurred if the injured party had
been able to. . . "cover". . . . If the inability of the injured party to
make such arrangements was foreseeable by the party in breach at
the time he made the contract, the resulting loss was foreseeable.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 comment d (1981). The implica-
tion of this rule is that if the inability to "cover" was unforeseeable at the time
of contracting, the resulting losses also were unforeseeable and the breaching
party is not liable for them. Even in jurisdictions applying the UCC foresee-
ability rule for the sale of goods, this common law rule might preclude a plain-
tiff from recovering consequential damages from the defendant if, for
example, the defendant breached a service contract but could not replace the
defendant's services due to an unforeseeable shortage of workers.
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Seaman's needed an oil supply contract to obtain a lease,M but
it probably did not foresee that Seaman's would be unable to
obtain another long-term supply contract if Standard
breached. 24 Standard did know at the time it breached, how-
ever, that Seaman's would be unable to cover; Standard itself
had adopted a "no new business policy" in the wake of the oil
crisis.12- If a court denies consequential damages flowing from
a bad faith breach of contract in a situation like this simply be-
cause they were not foreseeable by the parties at the time of
contracting, it rewards the breaching party for becoming op-
pressive at the opportune moment and undercompensates the
nonbreaching party. Courts could escape this danger and still
avoid runaway liability by limiting damages to those that the
breaching party reasonably could have foreseen at the time of
the bad faith breach.126
Although this functional approach to formulating remedies
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith initially may
seem to be as expansive as simply permitting tort remedies, it
123. See Seaman% 36 Cal. 3d at -, 686 P.2d at 1175, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 371
(Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting); Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note
4, at 7 (one of Standard's agents testified that Standard's letter was intended to
give Seaman's "something that they could present to the City").
124. Seaman's and Standard reached their agreement in 1972, before the
Arab oil embargo struck the United States economy. Seaman, 36 Cal. 3d at
-, 686 P.2d 1161, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 357; see authorities cited supra note 7.
125. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at -, 686 P.2d at 1161, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
126. Cf. Comment, Inadequacy of Hadley v. Baxendale As a Rule for Deter-
mining Legal Cause, 26 U. Prrr. L. REV. 795, 809 (1965) (arguing that the de-
fendant who negligently breaches a contract should be liable for consequential
damages foreseeable at the time of breach and the defendant who willfully
breaches should be liable for all consequential damages substantially caused by
the breach).
The UCC has followed this approach in moving the point at which one
measures foreseeability of loss from the time of contracting to the time of
breach. Although the general rule of § 2-715(2) incorporates the foreseeability
doctrine of Hadley v. Baxendale, see supra notes 23 & 122, the Code in effect
shifts the risk of losses resulting from the buyer's unforeseeable inability to
cover to the breaching seller as long as the seller had reason to know the
buyer's needs at the time of contracting. See supra note 121.
Courts often appear willing to ease the foreseeability and certainty rules,
albeit surreptitiously. See, eg., Standard Mach. Co. v. Duncan Shaw Corp., 208
F.2d 61, 64 (1953); Delong Corp. v. Lucas, 176 F. Supp. 104, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1959),
affd, 278 F.2d 804 (1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 833 (1960); California Lettuce
Growers v. Union Sugar Co., 45 Cal. 2d 474, 487, 289 P.2d 785, 793 (1955); Over-
street v. Merritt, 186 Cal. 494, 505-06, 200 P. 11, 16 (Cal 1921); 5 A. CORBIN,
supra note 21, § 1020, at 125-26 (1964); C. McCORbuc, DAmAGES § 140, at 574-
75 (1935); Bauer, Consequential Damages in Contrac4 80 U. PA. L. REV. 687,
699 (1932); Bauer, The Degree of Moral Fault As Affecting Defie nt's Liabil-
ity, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 586, 592 (1933); Comment, supra, at 809.
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has several advantages. In an action for tortious breach of the
implied covenant, the jury must carefully scrutinize the defend-
ant's oppressive, malicious, or fraudulent conduct before award-
ing punitive damages. Yet under the functional approach to
damages for bad faith breach of contract, the defendant's be-
havior would be relevant only insofar as it creates problems or
doubts in measuring the plaintiff's damages. Evidence of the
defendant's behavior would be admissible to establish its bad
faith breach, but any inflammatory or prejudicial evidence
would be excluded since the defendant's malicious behavior
would be irrelevant for purposes of compensating the plain-
tiff. 2 7 This limitation would help to prevent a jury from using
the relaxed rules of certainty and foreseeability to grant run-
away compensatory damages as a substitute for punitive dam-
ages. Similarly, evidence of the defendant's wealth, currently
admissible to determine the amount of punitive damages neces-
sary to punish the defendant,'2 also would be excluded as irrel-
evant. '- Finally, the functional approach would promote
economic efficiency by discouraging those wasteful breaches in
which the breaching party has reason to know that its gains
will not exceed the nonbreaching party's compensable losses. 130
A party that contemplates breaching in bad faith might recon-
sider if it knew that it would not be permitted to benefit from
the traditional limitations on contract damages.
CONCLUSION
The facts of Seaman's present a compelling case for look-
ing beyond traditional contract damages to remedy bad faith
breaches. Standard, knowing that the expansion plans of Sea-
man's were dependent on the fuel supply contract, denied the
existence of the contract in the midst of the oil crisis.' 3 ' In do-
ing so, it attempted to deprive Seaman's of one of the funda-
mental expectations of all contracting parties--compensation
for breach in the form of contract damages. In light of the
growing use of the tort of breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in the insurance, consumer, and em-
127. See FED. R. EVID. 401-403.
128. See Bertero v. National Gen. Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43, 65, 529 P.2d 608, 614,
118 Cal. Rptr. 184, 200 (1974).
129. See FED. R. Evim. 401-403.
130. See Diamond, supra note 30, at 439-46. Contrary to Diamond's thesis,
it is not necessary to make a bad faith breach of contract a tort to get this ef-
fect. See Burton, supra note 104, at 372-73; Farber, supra note 109, at 1445.
131. See Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at -, 686 P.2d at 1161, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
1196 [Vol. 69:1161
BAD FAITH BREACH9
ployment contexts, 3 ' Seaman's seemed to offer an appropriate
occasion for the California Supreme Court to consider ex-
tending the tort to the commercial context. Although the court
purported not to decide on the Seaman's facts whether to make
this extension, its new tort of bad faith denial of contract does
not stand on its own and is more accurately described as a type
of breach of the implied covenant of good faith.
Characterizing a breach of the implied covenant of good
faith as tortious may be justified in the insurance, and perhaps
employment and consumer,1 33 contexts because of policy con-
siderations that require the imposition of a special duty of care
on the stronger party to the contract. Yet no matter how egre-
giously a party to a commercial contract violates the implied
covenant of good faith, the breach should not be considered tor-
132. See supra notes 28-29, 46, 59 & 64-65 and accompanying text
133. Some courts have noted that the presence of self-interest strips a first-
party insurance contract of fiduciary qualities, one of the key policy factors
supporting tort liability for breach of the implied covenant of good faith. See,
eg., Lawton v. Great S.W. Fire Ins. Co., 118 N.H. 607, 614, 392 A.2d 576, 580-81
(1978). The same problem exists in the employment and consumer settings,
for both the employee and the consumer seek to "profit" from their dealings
with the stronger party. See Note, supra note 71, at 166 ('While insureds con-
tract to protect themselves from risk, employees, like stockholders, contract
for commercial advantage."). A California appellate court has construed the
concept of "profit" narrowly, however, in holding that an employee entered a
contract for payments in order to secure financial stability and peace of mind,
not for commercial advantage. See Wallis v. Kroehler Mfg. Co., 160 Cal. App.
3d 1109, -, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123, 129 (1984).
In a consumer class action suit alleging fraudulent, misleading, and decep-
tive advertising in the marketing of breakfast cereals, the California Supreme
Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that "imposition of fiduciary obliga-
tions is appropriate whenever one party with a stronger bargaining position or
greater knowledge has the ability to reach out and exploit the weaker party."
Committee on Children's T.V. v. General Foods Corp., 35 Cal. 3d 197, 221, 673
P.2d 660, 675, 197 Cal. Rptr. 783, 798 (1983). The court held that fiduciary prin-
ciples were generally inappropriate in the buyer-seller relationship but noted
that there might be exceptional cases in which a buyer's heavy reliance,
known to the seller, might justify imposition of a fiduciary duty. See id. at 222
n.22, 673 P-2d at 676 n.22, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 799 n.22. Perhaps the idea of
"profit" can be construed narrowly, as it seemed to be in Wallis, as a pure in-
tent to increase one's tangible wealth. One could argue, for example, that in
buying a home or contracting to build a home, the consumer seeks security
and peace of mind rather than financial gain. Cf. Jones v. Abriani, 169 Ind.
App. 556, 350 N.E.2d 635 (1976) (seller held liable for oppressive breach of con-
tract in selling defective mobile home to young married couple).
Nonetheless, as in commercial contracts, the fiduciary qualities of employ-
ment and consumer contracts are not as strong as those in third-party insur-
ance cases. As a result, it is unclear whether courts outside California will
permit tort liability for breach of the implied covenant of good faith in em-
ployment and consumer contracts.
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tious; each party to the contract holds itself out as being sophis-
ticated enough to be in business and knows that it cannot rely
for the protection of its interests on the other contracting party.
Consequently, courts should not use tort liability and punitive
damages to condemn one business for putting its own interests
before those of another business.
Courts can, however, ensure that the breaching party does
not take advantage of the formal rules of contract remedies to
avoid its obligation to pay the nonbreaching party adequate
contract damages, a fundamental expectation in any business
bargain. Courts apply the implied covenant of good faith in or-
der to protect a nonbreaching party's expectations under the
contract when the breaching party obeys the express terms of
the agreement but fails to cooperate in achieving the benefits
for which both parties bargained. Breach of the implied cove-
nant of good faith, however, should not lead to tort liability in
the commercial setting. Instead of creating a new, confusing
tort that only can lead to more litigation, the Seaman's court
should have rejected the theory of tortious breach of the im-
plied covenant of good faith in commercial contracts and fo-
cused its creative energy on shaping traditional contract
remedies to protect the expectations of plaintiffs that can prove
a breach of the implied covenant of good faith. Although this
Comment can only act as a compass, it proposes that courts fac-
ing bad faith breaches of commercial contracts bear in mind the
functional quality of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing and, if necessary, sail bravely into the uncharted waters
of innovative contract remedies.
Eileen A. Scallen
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